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2 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters,
 II Field Force Vietnam

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
 Major General, USA
 The Adjutant General

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
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OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR PERIOD ENDING 30 APRIL 1967

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SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) OPERATIONS

a. During the last quarter, there were three major changes in the staff and commanders of II FFORCEV.

(1) On 15 Feb brigadier General Robert C. Forbes became Chief of Staff. General Forbes was previously the Assistant Division Commander of the 9th Infantry Division. He replaced Colonel James H. Dyson, who was assigned to the Staff of the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

(2) On 7 Mar General Frederick C. Weyand became the first Deputy Commanding General of II FFORCEV. The position was established when the II FFORCEV operational area was enlarged, and II FFORCEV was given the additional mission of conducting operations in the IV Corps Tactical Zone. General Weyand had previously commanded the 25th Infantry Division since August of 1964.

(3) On 24 Mar Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, Jr., formerly the CG, XVIII Airborne Corps, became Commanding General of II FFORCEV. He replaced Lieutenant General Jonathan O. Seaman, who had commanded II FFORCEV from the date it was redesignated as II Field Force, Vietnam on 15 March 1966. General Seaman was reassigned as special consultant in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army.

b. The major change in the force structure of II FFORCEV was the deployment of units to Operation OREGON. These units were transferred to the operational control of III MAF when they closed on 9 April into I Corps Tactical Zone. The units involved were:

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- (1) 196th Inf Bde (Sep)(Lt)
- (2) 2d Bn 11th Arty (155T)
- (3) 2d Sqdn 11th Armd Cav Regt
- (4) 71st Aslt Hel Co
- (5) 178th Aslt Spt Hel Co
- (6) CoC, 2d Bn 34th Armor
- (7) Co C, 25th Med Bn

The only unit shown as deployed on the troop list (Incl 1) is the 196th Light Infantry Bde. All other deployments were subordinate elements of units which remained in the III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). All of the OREGON units have been deleted from the II FFORCEV Order of Battle (Incl 2) because they are no longer available for employment in the III CTZ.

The artillery searchlight batteries, one assault helicopter company, and one assault support helicopter company deployed to II FFORCEV from CONUS.

The 7th Bn, Royal Australian Regiment replaced the 5th Bn, RAR in the 1st Australian Task Force during April.

Three US combat tracker teams, trained in Malaya, returned to II FFORCEV. Two were attached to 25th Inf Div and one to 1st Inf Div.

c. The overall assigned/attached strength of II FFORCEV has continued to increase. A comparison at the end of the last four reporting periods follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>
31 Jul 66	164	23	1024
31 Oct 66	205	29	1450
31 Jan 67	346	39	3107
30 Apr 67	359	36	3503

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d. II FFORCEV Order of Battle, to include location and the control headquarters, is shown in Inclosure 2.

e. A sketch showing the III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) with major unit CP locations is shown in Inclosure 3. Inclosure 4 is a sketch of the IV CTZ.

2. (FOUO) PERSONNEL, HEALTH, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE.

a. The personnel situation remains excellent in all units assigned, attached or under operational control of II FFORCEV. The shortage of infantry captains in the 9th Infantry Division is expected to be solved by the USARV G-1 plan. USARV is transferring captains from other units, diverting selected incoming captains, and has made a one time allocation of approximately 50 captains from CONUS. The MTOE for HQ, II FFORCEV has not been approved. Therefore, it continues to be a challenge to obtain staff officer replacements for the MTOE spaces. The transition through the period of rotational humps was smooth. Replacement personnel for TOE spaces were available to provide desired overlap. Continued emphasis is being placed on the reduction of rotational humps in II FFORCEV units where applicable.

b. On 22 February the headquarters established a Tactical CP at Dau Tieng for control of Operation JUNCTION CITY.

c. Development of the base camp continued satisfactorily. Construction of a 500-man mess hall was completed; construction of semi-permanent billets for enlisted personnel is nearing completion; and temporary on-post billeting for key officer personnel was completed. Construction has started on an EM Club and a Community Center Building.

d. The following reductions were made in the Local National Labor Force:

<u>CATEGORY OF WORKERS</u>	<u>AUTH</u> 31 Jan 67	<u>AUTH</u> 30 Apr 67
Direct Hire	319	184
Daily Hire	550	307

This reduction will greatly assist in the Piaster Expenditures Reduction Program, but it will delay self-help construction projects.

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e. The health of the command continues to be excellent. (See Section II: Disease and Aeromedical Evacuation)

f. Troop morale continues to be high. Activities include:

(1) Completion of one softball field and one permanent volleyball court.

(2) Procurement of USO shows to include: Nancy Sinatra, Dale Robertson, Henry Fonda, D's, USA Jamboree, the Slippery Rock String Quartet and four others.

(3) The addition of car sales, film and portrait section, shoe sales and a snack concession in the Post Exchange.

g. The Office of the Provost Marshal had the following significant activities during the quarter.

(1) Evacuation arrangements were coordinated with the 89th Military Police Group for the movement of 216 Prisoners of War. They were moved from US Forces PW Collecting Points to the ARVN III Corps PW Camp at Bien Hoa. Special evacuation arrangements were also coordinated with the PM of I FFORCEV for the movement of 200 PW's from the II CTZ.

(2) A study was made to determine the most suitable location for a centralized control point for the entry and exit of indigenous personnel working in the base camp. As a result, a check point was established between the 552d Military Police Company and the 9th Transportation Company. Plans for the required structure were submitted and approved. Construction is scheduled to begin in May 67. This will facilitate the processing of indigenous employees and improve security of the base camp area.

(3) The 3d Quarter FY 67 Offender Statistics Report was compiled on assigned and attached units. The report revealed increases in offenses in five areas: AWOL, curfew, pass, off-limits and traffic violations. These increases were due primarily to intensified law enforcement.

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

a. Three major operations were conducted by direction of this headquarters during the reporting period. The intelligence information

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upon which each of the operations was based and the results of each have been summarized. Enemy losses listed are total losses as of the close of the operation or the close of the reporting period, whichever was earlier.

(1) Operation FAIRFAX.

(a) Intelligence Aspects: This is a continuing operation directed against the VC infrastructure, local force units and installations in and around the Capital Military District (CMD). Prior to Operation FAIRFAX, deterioration of GVN control was evident by the VC's increased freedom of movement throughout the area, an increase in guerrilla strength and the expansion of the infrastructure. GVN control was weak, and large VC units moved with little chance of detection by US or GVN forces. This posed a major threat to the suburbs of Saigon and to major GVN and US installations within Saigon and the CMD. The operation began on 1 Dec 1966 and was still in progress at the close of the reporting period.

(b) Results: In the last quarter, there were no large unit contacts in the CMD. US Forces worked closely with the GVN military and civilian officials. The major accomplishment of the period was the establishment of district combined intelligence centers. A center is jointly operated by the US, ARVN and GVN forces of the district. Intelligence from all sources is rapidly identified, evaluated and disseminated. Optimum results have been obtained because of immediate reaction. It is further assumed that the numerous contacts with small VC units is having a marked effect on the morale of the local VC forces and the infrastructure in the area. Combined intelligence centers have been established in three of the districts in the operational area. It is planned to establish centers in the remaining three districts during the next quarter. During the past three months the mission of Operation FAIRFAX was expanded to include all districts in the CMD. Total enemy losses, as of 30 April, for Operation FAIRFAX follow:

1. Personnel: 673 VC KIA (BC), 109 PW, 1,534 detainees, 36 returnees.

2. Equipment Captured: 189 small arms, 1 M-72 LAW (US), 6 machine gun barrels, 13,173 rds small arms ammunition, 100 artillery and mortar rounds, 1-55 gal drum of mixed ammunition, 391 grenades, 19 land mines, 9 claymore mines, 18 booby traps, 820 lbs of

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TNT, 177.5 lbs of documents, 18 sampans, 17 outboard engines, 493 lbs of medical supplies, 3 homemade radios, 1 loudspeaker, 27 small arms magazines, 1 film editing machine, misc radio parts, 40,890 \$VN, 2 AN/PRC-10 radios, 5 typewriters, 5 sewing machines, misc clothing, 3 generators, 180.4 tons of rice, 1,500 empty grenade casings, 200 lbs of aluminum sheeting, 1 truck engine, 1,000 lbs of scrap iron, 1 large smelter, 7 steel plates 4 x 8 ft x 1 1/4 in, 156 bottles of penicillin, 12 plows, 5 shovels, 1 trip flare and 9 M-79 rds.

3. Equipment destroyed: 510 military structures, 1,868 bunkers, 330 meters of bunker complex, 14 tunnels, 253 sampans, 1 foot bridge, 76.7 tons of rice, 2,013 rds of small arms ammunition, 141 grenades, 6 artillery and mortar rounds, 147 land mines, 105 booby traps, 16 small bomblets, 1 shovel, 1 gas mask, 8 bags of cement, 20 lbs of gunpowder, 894 lbs of TNT, 1 water purification system, 3 outboard engines and 2 rounds of small arms ammunition.

(2) Operation JUNCTION CITY.

(a) Intelligence Aspects: This operation began on 22 Feb in War Zone C (northern Tay Ninh Province). Intelligence was developed prior to the operation from agent reports, captured documents, PW's and ralliers. It indicated that HQ's COSVN (Central Office South Vietnam) and the 9th VC Div were utilizing this area as a safe haven, training area and a rest and recuperation center. COSVN is the supreme headquarters for the VC in South Vietnam. During the initial planning phases, the operation was directed against the VC 9th Div and installations located in the eastern portion of the Zone. Immediately prior to the beginning of the operation, a reorientation was necessary because elements of the 9th Div moved out of the planned area of operation. The reorientation directed FVMAF forces to northern War Zone C against COSVN. Two deception operations were conducted prior to JUNCTION CITY to cover the troop movement and logistical buildup in the area adjacent to War Zone C. Operation GADSDEN was conducted by the 25th Inf Div against the VC 271st Regt in the extreme western portion of War Zone C along the Cambodian border. The 1st Inf Div conducted TUCSON in the area east of the Michelin Rubber Plantation against the VC 272d Regt. During the initial phase, FVMAF forces had sporadic contact with elements of the 70th Guard Regt. HQ elements of COSVN moved to the vicinity of the Cambodian border (XU 1503) and to eastern War Zone C. Indications of the 272d VC Regt and 101st NVA Regt of the 9th VC Div moving into the area of operations were confirmed by the following contacts: 28 Feb 67 (XT 2973) 2d Bn, 101st NVA Regt;

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10 Mar 67 (XT 2878) 272d VC Regt; and 15 Mar 67 (XT 2778, XT 2868) 101st NVA Regt and Z37 Arty Bn. These attacks marked the first known use of 120mm mortars in the III CTZ and gave indications that the VC would use larger forces to defend safe havens from FVMAF forces. Based on the new disposition of the 9th VC Div, Phase II was increased in size and directed against the HQ's and Regts of the 9th VC Div. During this phase, two major contacts were made. On 21 Mar 67 (XT 3872), the 272d Regt attacked a fire support base of the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div. VC losses were over 600 VC KIA (BC). On 31 Mar 67 (XT 4385), the VC 271st Regt and 1st Bn 70th Guard Regt attacked elements of the 1st Div. VC losses: 585 KIA (BC). These attacks are of major significance because they marked the first regimental-sized attacks against US forces in III CTZ. This indicates the importance the VC placed on War Zone C as a safe haven. On 20 Mar the 273d VC Regt attacked elements of the 3/5th Cav along RT 13 (XT 7845). This is also interpreted as being a major VC attack in support of the VC 9th Div within War Zone C. JUNCTION CITY continues.

(b) Results: Large quantities of documents were captured which have provided valuable information on recent changes in the VC organization and intentions for future operations. COSVN, the VC 9th Div and other VC units suffered severe personnel and material losses. Enemy losses as of 30 April:

1. Personnel: 2,724 VC KIA (BC), 34 PW, 137 returnees and 64 detainees.

2. Equipment Captured: 491 individual weapons, 95 crew-served weapons, 22,080 rds of small arms ammunition, 148 rds of artillery and mortar ammunition, 68 rds of recoilless rifle ammunition, 20 land mines, 3 claymore mines, 299 grenades, 40 lbs of explosives, 117.5 tons of rice, 4.7 tons of salt, 2.2 tons of sugar, 1 set of signal operations instructions (SOI), 5 US radios, 2 Chinese Communist radios, 3 radios of unknown origin, 41 civilian radios, 1 public address set, 9 loudspeakers, 2 telephone switchboards, 4 transformers, 2 dynamos, 17,361 flashlight batteries (BA-30), 6,000 ft of copper wire, 35 miles of telephone wire, 17 field telephones, 5 civilian type telephones, 5 generators, 205 vials of medicine, 25 protective gas masks, 10 typewriters, 5 projectors, 3 printing presses, 1 mimeograph machine, 22 cameras, 2 tape recorders, 2 tapes, 201 rolls of exposed film, 2,000 feet of unexposed film, 3 sewing machines, 5 gasoline engines, 1,221 lbs of documents, 641 lbs of medical supplies, 18 medical kits, 12 flare pistols, 2,200 lbs of field gear, 1 ton of propaganda material and 645 lbs of clothing.

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3. Material destroyed: 5 crew-served weapons, 78,370 rds of small arms ammunition, 601 artillery and mortar rounds, 695 rds of recoilless rifle ammunition, 375 land mines, 93 claymore mines, 6,275 hand grenades, 17 bombs, 166 bomblets, 1,245 lbs of explosives, 1,550 blasting caps, 6,210 meters of detonating cord, 693.1 tons of rice, 5.9 tons of salt, 7.2 tons of dried fish, 1,671 gals of cooking oil, 4,122 bunkers, 1,414 military structures, 72 tunnels, 2,659 gals of POL products, 124 bicycles, 47 oxcarts, 473 sheets of tin, 1 bridge, 790 lbs of clothing, 600 yds of cloth, 808 uniforms, 205 vehicle tires, 13 civilian radios, 4 telephones, 3 gas engines, 3 sewing machines, 5 rice husking machines, 32 sampans, 20 protective gas masks, 10 flare pistols, 50 lbs of opium and 1 claymore mine test set.

(3) Operation MANHATTAN.

(a) Intelligence aspects. MANHATTAN was launched on 23 Apr 67 in the area between the Michelin Plantation and the Iron Triangle of Binh Duong Province. The mission was to locate and destroy elements of the headquarters of the Military Region IV, GP 83 COSVN Bear Services, local units and the VC infrastructure. Intelligence gained during Operation CEDAR FALLS (Jan 1967) plus reports of continued enemy liaison and supply activities provided additional evidence that this area was a major VC headquarters and supply base in the III CTZ. Their destruction was vital to the continued success of the Revolutionary Development program and the election campaign in the surrounding areas. The destruction would also eliminate a major VC safe haven from which harrassing and terroristic activities were being directed.

(b) Results. Operation MANHATTAN maintained the pressure on the VC administrative and logistical systems that was initiated during operations ATTLEBORO and CEDAR FALLS. MANHATTAN continues. Results as of 30 April:

1. Personnel: 106 VC KIA (BC), 14 PW and 74 detainees.

2. Equipment Captured: 192 tons of rice, 150 canteen covers, 139 small arms, three 50 caliber machine gun barrels, 1 M-79 round, 1 grenade launcher, 1 civilian type radio, 1 tape recorder, 1 microphone, 922 uniforms, 2 sewing machines, 6 RPG-2 rocket launcher rounds, 50 rolls of sheet metal, 19 bicycles, 267 lbs of documents, 1 case of M16 ammo, 700 packages of transistors, 8 mines, 7 bomblets, 126 grenades, 2 US generators, 600 rifle grenade casings, 1 diary, 10 bottles of penicillin, 2 drill presses, 1 barrel of carbide, 3 outboard motors, 10 grenade castings, 4 protective gas masks, 1 soldering torch, 5 lbs of rivets, 12 oxcarts, 2 rice milling machines, 1 blood pressure

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gauge, 51 lbs of clothing, 193 lbs of medical supplies, 8 rds of artillery and mortar ammo, 7 crew-served weapons, 47,817 rds of small arms ammo, 600 ft of electric wire, 1 typewriter, 200 bolts of cloth, 1 wristwatch, 1 flag, 3,140 ft of communications wire, 1 ice box, 1 sampan, 500 batteries and 2 printing presses.

3. Material destroyed: 196.7 tons of rice, 500 lbs of salt, 60 bags of cement, 89 booby traps, 350 claymore mines, 1,842 grenades, 930 bunkers, 64 claymore mine casings, 34 banagalore torpedos, 182 military structures, 24 tunnels, 93 land mines, 1,089 artillery and mortar rounds, 176 bomblets, 13 bombs, 183,174 rds of small arms ammo, 16 rds of M-79 ammo, 468 lbs of clothing, 2,780 lbs of dried fish, 15 bicycles, 1,000 burlap bags, 2 typewriters, 3 sampans, 30 rds of RPG-2 ammo, 15 shaped charges, 32 claymore mine kits, 1 outboard motor, 3 anvils, 1 sledge hammer, 30 uniforms, 453 lbs of explosives, 65 gals of kerosene, 250 sheets of tin, 1 lathe, 500 gals of cooking oil, 25 canteens, 1 printing press, 1 generator, 300 lbs of lime and 1,500 lbs of cement.

b. Intelligence Collection.

(1) During the quarter, Intelligence Collection areas (ICA) designated in the II FFORCEV Intelligence Collection Plan, dated 28 Jan 67, were reviewed. Some areas were considered unsatisfactory because the ICA boundaries did not follow the established GVN Province/District boundaries. New ICA boundaries will correspond with existing GVN boundaries and the boundaries of FWMAF tactical areas of interest. This will also assist in the correlation of intelligence at both the Provincial Intelligence Coordination Centers (PICC) and District Combined Intelligence Centers.

(2) The Source Control Registry established at this headquarters has been used for approximately three months. During this period, all II FFORCEV tactical Military Intelligence Detachments have used the registry to check the authenticity of their paid informants and to insure that the informant wasn't working for another agency, thereby receiving double payment. All users have evaluated the usefulness of the registry, and it has been decided that it is superfluous. This registry merely duplicates existing ones at higher headquarters. Therefore, the registry at this headquarters is being eliminated.

c. Description and Recapitulation of Enemy Order of Battle.

(1) Description.

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(a) The Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) is the supreme military/political headquarters for the VC in South Vietnam. The VC divide the territory of both North and South Vietnam into military regions. All of Military Region I and IV and the Rung Sat Special Military Region II, south of Saigon, and two of the three provinces of the recently verified Military Region X lie inside the III CTZ. The boundaries are shown in Inclosure 5.

1. In 1966 the Rung Sat Special Zone was known as Military Region X. However, it has been recently verified that a new Military Region X has been created. The newly created Region lies along the Cambodian border and provides the VC a stronghold area with access into Cambodia. The Region is frequently referred to as the Southwestern Highland Military Region. The new Region consists of one province previously in Military Region I (Binh Long) and two provinces from Military Region VI (Phuoc Long and Quang Duc). With the activation of the new Military Region X, the command element for the RSSZ has apparently been downgraded. The Rung Sat area is now referred to as GROUP (DOAN) 10. Its specific relationship to the surrounding regions has not been confirmed. However, there are indications that it is subordinate to MR II.

2. The remainder of Military Region I is also known as T1, MR7 and the Eastern Nambo Military Region.

3. Military Region IV is the zone around the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh area. It is also known as T4 or the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Special Zone.

(b) During the reporting period, the boundaries of the VC military regions and provinces have been altered somewhat in the III CTZ. As cited above, the major alteration came with the formation of MR X. At the provincial level, there are indications that a reorganization has occurred with the formation of Long-Ba-Bien Province by combining Long Khanh, Ba Ria and Bien Hoa Provinces. However, at this time, this reorganization remains unconfirmed. The VC and the GVN province boundaries do not coincide, nor do they define the same geographical area by the same name.

(2) Significant Order of Battle Developments.

(a) The 52d NVA Regiment has been dropped from the Order of Battle. This action was based on analysis of captured documents and information from a rallier. He stated that the 52d NVA Regiment had been deactivated to provide replacements for other main force units, particularly Cong Truong 9 (9th Div).

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(b) Analysis of captured documents indicate that the 69th Artillery Regt has been reorganized. The first battalion of the 69th VC Arty Regt, Z35, has changed its cover designation to the 52d VC Arty Bn. It is believed to be a composite artillery battalion with a strength of 300. The second battalion, Z37, has apparently been disbanded. The third battalion, Z39, has been carried by II Field Force Order of Battle as a unit attached to the Combined Artillery Group of Cong Truong 5 (5th Div) since 23 Oct 66. It now appears that this battalion was permanently assigned to Cong Truong 5 and formed the nucleus for the Combined Artillery Group of that division. The 4th Bn of the 69th VC Arty Regt, Z41, was deactivated. The men and equipment were reassigned as Combat Support elements for the battalions and specialized units of the 272d VC Regt in Dec 64. The fifth Battalion, Z43, was combined with Infiltration Gp 529 and redesignated the 56th VC Arty Battalion. This is an anti-aircraft battalion with a strength of 400. In early 1966 a new combat support battalion was formed. It was composed largely of personnel from the D20B Infiltration Gp. This battalion is now known as the 58th VC Arty Bn and is presently the third battalion of the 69th VC Arty Regt. It is probably a composite battalion with a strength of 400.

(c) A replacement training and convalescent unit has been identified by analysis of captured documents. It is designated as B525 and is located in Cambodia. This unit has a total strength of 8500 personnel in the following categories.

800 Cadremen

700 Convalescents

950 Sick and wounded

3050 Personnel for Task "X" (Task "X" is believed to be associated with Cong Truong 9).

3000 Personnel designated recruits "C". (Believed to be individuals of Vietnamese origin who reside in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand and are required to perform 2 weeks military duty annually).

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B-525 is in a secure area, immune to attacks by Free World Military Assistance Forces. It is available to train and supply units on an area or unit basis.

(d) Translation of captured documents reveal that the 70th Guard Regt has been deactivated. The headquarters was eliminated; the personnel were reassigned to the remaining three battalions. The 1st Bn of the 70th Regt has been placed under the control of the Military Staff Department of COSVN. The other battalions were placed under the control of sectors. This reorganization of the 70th Guard Regt does not change its primary mission. It provides security for the administrative and rear service elements of COSVN. The change does provide the Military Staff of COSVN with a consolidated strike battalion.

(e) The 76th Replacement Regiment was recently activated in the Quang Duc/Phuoc Long Province border area. Captured documents reveal that the mission of this unit is to receive infiltration groups and personnel released from hospitals. According to a rallier and captured documents, cadre from the 680th Tng Regt were used to form the 76th Replacement Regt.

(f) According to captured documents, Group 85 Rear Services element has been reactivated. It has been designated to assume some of the tasks currently assigned to Rear Services Group 82. Group 85 was previously the rear services group for Binh Long Province. Analysis of documents indicates that Group 82 has the rear service responsibility for Binh Long Province east of Highway 13. Group 85 will probably assume the rear service responsibility for the remainder of Binh Long Province.

(3) Recapitulation.

(a) The VC Provinces of Military Regions I, II, IV, VI, and X control 35 local force companies and 27 local force platoons in the III CTZ.

(b) Within the III CTZ there are seven confirmed local force battalions located in four VC provinces of MR 1 and MR 2. There are six local force battalions subordinate to six different districts in MR 4. The seven local force battalions located in MR 1 and 2 are:

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<u>Local Force Bns</u>	<u>VC Province</u>
Phu Loi Bn	Thu Dau Mot Province (GVN Binh Duong)
2d Independent Bn	Long An Province
506th Bn	Long An Province
14th Bn	Tay Ninh Province
D445 Bn	Ba Ria Province (GVN Phouc Tuy Province)
2d Guard Bn	Tay Ninh Province
3d Guard Bn	Tay Ninh Province

(c) There are five VC main force battalions and 11 main force regiments operating in the III CTZ. These units and their controlling headquarters are:

<u>VC Main Force Bns and/or Regts</u>	<u>Controlling HQ</u>
Dong Nai Bn (aka D800)	MR 1
1st Bn MR 4	MR 4
8th Bn (combat support) MR 4	MR 4
C44 Sapper Bn	MR 4
1st Guard Bn	COSVN
69th Artillery Regt (aka U80)	COSVN
273d Regt	COSVN
Dong Thap II Regt	MR II
271st Regt	Cong Truong 9 (9th Div)
272d Regt	Cong Truong 9 (9th Div)

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274th Regt	Cong Truong 5 (5th Div)
275th Regt	Cong Truong 5 (5th Div)

(d) There are four North Vietnamese Army Regiments operating in the III CTZ. These regiments are:

<u>NVA Regiments</u>	<u>Controlling HQ</u>
101 NVA Regt	Cong Truong 9 (9th Div)
165 NVA Regt	Cong Truong 7 (7th Div)
141 NVA Regt	Cong Truong 7 (7th Div)
84A Artillery Regt	COSVN

(e) See Inclosure 6 for sketch map of enemy locations in III CTZ as of 30 April.

(f) The following is a list of only those VC Main and Local force battalions which are located in the 9th US Division's current Operational area in IV CTZ:

<u>BATTALION</u>	<u>SUBORDINATION</u>
261st VC Inf Bn/DT-1 VC Regt	MR-2
263d VC Inf Bn/DT-1 VC Regt	MR-2
306th VC MF Inf Bn	MR-3
518th VC MF Inf Bn	MR-2
501st VC LF Inf Bn	Vinh Binh Province
502d VC LF Inf Bn	Kien Phong Province
504th VC LF Inf Bn	Kien Tuong Province
D509 VC LF Inf Bn	Vinh Binh Province
514th VC LF Inf Bn	Dinh Tuong Province
516th VC LF Inf Bn	Kien Hoa Province
D857 VC LF Inf Bn	Vinh Long Province

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(g) See Inclosure 7 for a sketch map of all principal enemy unit locations in IV CTZ and the 9th US Division's operational area as of 30 April.

(4) Summary of recent Activities:

(a) During March the VC Cong Truong 9 Division (9th Div) and other units conducted regimental scale countersweep operations in the War Zone C. A countersweep operation is defined as any VC reaction taken during a FVMAF offensive operation. The reaction may be offensive or defensive, active or passive, in nature. During operation JUNCTION CITY, the following units were engaged in countersweep operations: Elements of COSVN, the 1st Guard Bn, the 273d VC Regt; and elements of the 9th VC Div, the 271st, 272d VC Regts and the 101st NVA Regt.

(b) The principal activity of the 5th VC Division has been harassment of friendly outposts and limited sweep operations. On 31 March an unidentified element of the 5th VC Division conducted an ambush against an ARVN convoy near the town of Gia Ray at YT6206. It appears that the 274th and 275th VC regiments have shifted into operational areas northeast of their previous base areas.

(c) The 7th NVA Division has moved from Phuoc Long Province to War Zone C. It is suspected that the 7th Division will assume the security mission for War Zone C, thus freeing the 9th Division for offensive operations.

(d) Military Region IV conducted harassment, terrorism and limited countersweep operations with its eight battalions. On 26 Feb the 1st Bn of Mr 4 and a local force company made contact with an ARVN unit in the Filhol Plantation. The VC suffered 141 KIA (BC). The other battalions of MR II have generally restricted themselves to local small-scale actions. It appears that Operation FAIRFAX has pushed the battalions out of their normal areas of operation.

(e) The 506th and the 2d Independent Local Force Bn launched several mortar and ground attacks against GVN outposts in the past three months. In March and April 262 VC from the 506th were killed in two engagements with elements of the US 9th Div. The D445 Bn of Ba Ria Province, the Phu Loi Bn of the Tau Dau Mot Province, and the 14th Bn of Tay Ninh Province were not encountered in any major contacts during the reporting period.

(f) Elements of the 2d Bde, 9th US Div, have had sporadic contact with VC Local Force and guerilla units since the beginning of Operation PALM BEACH. No major contact has taken place to-date.

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However, with continued US operations, more frequent and larger scale engagements may be expected (See Inclosure 7 for Enemy OB).

(5) Tactics:

(a) An enemy document captured during Operation JUNCTION CITY stated that during 1967 larger scale attacks would be conducted than in the previous year. The 9th VC Division and the 273d VC Regt mounted regimental-sized attacks throughout the month of March. This tactic of mass attack cost the VC approximately 1,800 dead (Body count). There has been no indication since March whether or not this tactic has been reevaluated in light of the heavy losses sustained.

(b) The formation of Military Region X is another attempt by the VC to develop a relatively safe, secure base area along the Cambodian Border from which to launch operations. This base area is a point of entry for personnel and material from Cambodia, and it is an avenue of escape to their sanctuary in Cambodia.

(c) For other tactical trends of the enemy see

Inclosure 8.

d. VC battle losses:

<u>FEB 67</u>									
<u>VC KIA</u>	<u>VC KIA</u>		<u>DETAIN-</u>	<u>HV</u>	<u>RD</u>		<u>BLDG</u>	<u>TONS</u>	
<u>(BC)</u>	<u>(POSS)</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>RES</u>	<u>SA</u>	<u>WPNS</u>	<u>AMMO</u>	<u>MD</u>	<u>DEST</u>	<u>RICE</u>
993	787	73	417	299	26	33,294	920	653	11,640.71
<u>MAR 67</u>									
2,898	700	55	1,265	454	82	49,021	1,091	1,154	868.25
<u>APR 67</u>									
<u>1,476</u>	<u>729</u>	<u>137</u>	<u>895</u>	<u>654</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>24,006</u>	<u>680</u>	<u>1,058</u>	<u>733.26</u>
<u>5,367</u>	<u>2,216</u>	<u>265</u>	<u>2,577</u>	<u>1,407</u>	<u>183</u>	<u>106,321</u>	<u>2,691</u>	<u>2,865</u>	<u>13,242.22</u>

The actual strength of main force units cannot be equated to battlefield losses due to two variables. Normally, supporting and local force units accompany main force units into battle, and the dead cannot be sorted according to unit. Secondly, there is a variation in the time required for a unit to recoup its losses, and this time is steadily decreasing. Previously replacements were locally recruited, untrained personnel. Recently, trained infiltrators are providing an

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Increasing percentage of the replacement pool. Therefore, the time required for a unit to become combat ready after suffering severe losses is steadily decreasing. VC losses merely reflect a loss in manpower assets, but they are not an accurate measure of unit strength for a given unit at a specific time.

e. Enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities and relative probability of adoption at the end of the quarter.

(1) Capabilities:

(a) Attack:

1. The enemy is capable of attacking in Tay Ninh with elements of the 7th NVA and 9th VC Divisions.
2. The enemy is capable of attacking in Binh Long Province with elements of the 271st, 272d and the 101st NVA Regiments.
3. The enemy is capable of attacking in Binh Tuy, Phuoc Tuy and southern Long Khanh Province with elements of the 274th and 275th VC Regiments.
4. The enemy is capable of attacking in Phuoc Long, Binh Long and Tay Ninh Provinces with elements of the 7th NVA Division.
5. All seven battalions of MR IV could be employed in attacks against GVN units, outposts and installations in their assigned districts.
6. The VC are capable of attacking in Long An Province with elements of the DT II Regt, 2d Independent Bn, and the 506th LF Bn and five local force companies.
7. The VC are capable of attacking in Hau Nghia Province with elements of the DT II Regt and two battalions of MR IV.
8. In the IV CTZ province of Dinh Tuong, the VC are capable of mounting a multibattalion-size operation against elements of the 9th US Div using the 514th LF and the two battalions of the Dong Thap I Regiment (the 261st and 263d MF Bns).

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(b) Defend:

1. The VC can defend in Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Binh Duong Provinces with the 9th VC Div and the 70th Security Regiment.

2. The VC can defend in War Zone D with elements of the 271st Regt, assisted by the D800 Battalion and possibly the 141st NVA Regt (aka 14th Regt).

3. The VC can defend in Phuoc Long Province with elements of the 7th NVA Div.

4. The enemy can defend in Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces with the 5th VC Div.

(c) Reinforce: The enemy can reinforce his attack or defense in the northern III CTZ with three separate battalions from the II CTZ and in the southern III CTZ with one regiment from the IV CTZ within three to ten days after commencing movement.

(2) Relative Probability of Adoption:

(a) 5th VC Div:

1. Attack friendly posts and troops in Phuoc Tuy, Binh Tuy and Long Khanh Provinces primarily along Route 1, 2 and 15.

2. Disperse in the face of friendly operations.

3. Defend safe areas in the May Tao and the Hat Dich areas supported by the D445 LF Bn and local guerrillas.

4. Reinforce with elements of the 7th NVA Div.

(b) 7th VC Div:

1. Defend positions, logistical installations and infiltration routes in zone.

2. Relocate elements to War Zones C and D to reinforce traditional VC strongholds.

3. Attack friendly posts and troops and interdict Highways 13, 14, 1 and 20 with elements of the 7th VC Div in Phuoc Long, Binh Long and possibly Tay Ninh Province.

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(c) 9th VC Div:

1. Attack friendly troops and outposts in Binh Long Province with elements of the 271st, 272d and possibly assisted by the 273d VC Regt.

2. Reinforce present units with elements of the 7th NVA Division.

3. Attack friendly troops and posts in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces with the elements listed in (1) above.

4. Withdraw to alternate positions or disperse into small groups.

(d) Local Force and Guerrillas:

1. Attack:

a. Continue harassment of ARVN, RF/PF and US installations with small arms and mortar fire at any time.

b. Interdict Highways 1, 4, 5, 13, 15 and Provincial Routes 2, 16, 333, 334, 335 by all available means to include the use of ambushes, mines, roadblocks and harassment of installations along all routes.

c. Attack any weakly defended hamlet, village or post at any time.

d. Support political objectives by conducting guerrilla, terrorist and subversive activities in areas under RVN control.

e. Conduct diversionary operations.

2. Defend logistical installations in areas of operations.

3. Reinforce by conscription of eligible manpower and temporary labor.

4. Withdraw by dispersing and assuming the cover of legitimate citizens.

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4. (C) OPERATIONS, PLANS AND TRAINING.

a. During the quarter, 17 military operations (battalion-size or larger) were conducted against the Viet Cong in the II FFORCEV zone of operations by units under the control of this headquarters. The zone is defined as the III CTZ, Gia Dinh Province, Rung Sat Special Zone and operational areas in the IV CTZ as directed by COMUSMACV. During the previous quarter, 63 battalion or larger sized operations were conducted. On the surface, 17 operations for this quarter would appear to be a drop in the number of operations; however, two of the operations during this quarter were multidivision involving 31 US maneuver battalions in JUNCTION CITY and 17 in MANHATTAN.

b. Analysis and Evaluation of the quarter.

(1) The past three months can be evaluated as the quarter in which War Zone C ceased to be an inviolable sanctuary for VC/NVA forces. In addition, main force units received crippling losses in their efforts to blunt the II FFORCEV invasion of War Zone C. Elements of COSVN can no longer regard this area as a safe haven from which to control VC activities in the III CTZ. The establishment of CIDG camps, the construction of C-130 airfields, and the upgrading of roads in War Zone C provided valuable assets for future operations in the area. The CIDG camps will be used as bases for long range reconnaissance, guerrillas and CIDG forces. From these bases, they can interdict VC lines of communications, restrict VC movements and gather valuable intelligence. The improved roads and airfields will be used by Free World and ARVN units to rapidly reenter War Zone C and exploit intelligence gathered by these smaller forces.

(2) While the bulk of II FFORCEV forces was engaged in War Zone C, the 9th Infantry Division was able to steadily improve its position in Long An, Gia Dinh, and Dinh Tuong Provinces; even though, one of its brigades was committed to Operation JUNCTION CITY. Significantly, the VC did not increase their activity in the populated areas while major US forces were absent. This permitted the 9th Infantry Division to continue development of bases at Dong Tam and in Long An Province on schedule with a minimum security force. The 199th Infantry Brigade pursued Operation FAIRFAX in three districts of Gia Dinh Province with minor VC opposition. As a result, II FFORCEV expanded FAIRFAX to include all of Gia Dinh Province.

(3) In summary, major US forces were committed to the very

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successful campaign of JUNCTION CITY and MANHATTAN in the jungle of War Zone C without any major VC reaction against ARVN or the US economy of force units remaining in the populated areas of III and IV CTZ. Some major base camp were harassed but not seriously attacked. Therefore, it would appear that large Free World and ARVN forces can be concentrated for major operations lasting several weeks provided economy of force elements are active in their areas and keep the local VC off balance. During the quarter, two of the three significant operations took place in War Zone C.

c. Three significant operations were conducted during the quarter. Two were multidivision operations: JUNCTION CITY and MANHATTAN. The third operation was titled PORTSEA. It was a joint operation with US and ARVN troops under the control of the 1st Australian Task Force.

(1) Operation JUNCTION CITY was conducted in three phases. Phase I was initiated by II FFORCEV on 22 February. It was the largest military offensive of the Vietnamese war. The operation was designed to clear (western) War Zone C of enemy forces and installations. The primary objective was the destruction of COSVN. The area, which has been a major Communist stronghold for the past 20 years, is only 75 miles NW of Saigon. The operation was launched following an extensive preparation conducted primarily by Air Force B-52 and close air support aircraft. It was a coordinated airmobile, airborne and ground assault to seal off escape routes into Cambodia and the eastern portion of War Zone C. On D-Day eight infantry battalions from the 1st Infantry Division, 173d Airborne Brigade and the 196th Infantry Brigade (Light) conducted airmobile assaults. This was in conjunction with a parachute assault by the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry to initiate the seal of the north and east portion of the objective area. Simultaneously, the 25th Infantry Division moved one brigade into blocking positions in the west. At the same time the 25th also positioned units in the south for an attack to the north. With the seal complete, the objective area was ringed by a "Horseshoe" of US Forces. The combined elements of the 25th Division and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment then thrust northward in an attack through the open end of the "Horseshoe." On D+2 Task Force Alpha, consisting of two Vietnamese Marine Battalions, conducted an airmobile operation into the northwestern sector of the "Horseshoe." The task force swept through its assigned zone without major VC contact. Meanwhile, elements of the 25th Div and the 11th ACR continued their attack northward.

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They methodically searched the objective area and subsequently made a westward swing to entrap enemy forces in the northwest corner of War Zone C. Significant results of Phase I included the opening of over 100km of roads and the construction of two C-130 airstrips and one CIDG camp.

Phase II of Operation JUNCTION CITY was launched on 18 March. II FFORCEV redeployed its forces to attack the VC who had moved into the eastern part of War Zone C during Phase I. In a series of coordinated airmobile and ground assaults, the 1st Infantry Division, the 173d Airborne Brigade, the 196th Infantry Brigade (Light) and the 3d Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division continued to apply an ever-increasing pressure on the VC. The enemy struck back abruptly with two successive major attacks. At 0500 hours on 20 March, while securing Highway 13, Troop A, 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry came under intensive mortar and ground attack by the 273d VC Regiment. The Troop held its ground. It was aided by immediate and effective artillery support coupled with continuous air strikes by the 7th USAF. By 0900 the 273d had broken contact and fled, leaving behind 227 of his dead. US losses: 3 killed, 63 wounded. The next morning the VC struck a second time. This time the 272d VC Regt attacked the 3d Bn, 22d Inf. Following the 0600 stand-to, the 3/22d Inf sent patrols to sweep the area around the Brigade's fire support base. The patrols made contact with a VC force at 0640. This triggered the attack by the 272d VC Regt. They opened fire with recoilless rifles and RPG-2s. At 0715 the VC launched a coordinated ground assault from the east, southeast and north. The attack began at close quarters with the VC emerging from the jungle near the bunker line. They had reached the bunker line of Company B when Battery C, 2/77th Arty opened fire with Beehive rounds at point-blank range. Ground fire, air strikes, armed helicopters and the point-blank firing of the artillery turned back the assaults. The remaining elements of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division reacted immediately and moved to join the battle. The 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry (Mechanized) and the 2d Battalion, 34th Armor (-) attacked from the southwest; the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry attacked from the northwest. Significant results of the battle were 635 VC KIA (BC), 7 PW, 65 crew-served weapons and 94 individual weapons captured. US troops suffered 31 killed and 109 wounded. JUNCTION CITY I and II have proven conclusively to the enemy that he no longer has a safe haven in War Zone C.

Phase III of JUNCTION CITY was reduced from a multidivision to a

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brigade-sized operation. The 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division secured the towns of Tay Ninh and Soui Da and Highway 26 south from Tay Ninh to the junction of Route 239. One battalion conducted search and destroy operations north of Highway 247, which runs east and west between Highways 2 and 14.

On 21 April the 25th Division assumed operational control of the 1st Brigade, 9th Division; Company A, 2/34th Armor and the 36th ARVN Ranger Battalion. This force took over the mission from the 3d Brigade, 4th Division. Phase III is still in progress.

(2) Operation MANHATTAN was initiated on 23 April as a major search and destroy operation. The mission was to defeat the VC in the Boi Loi Woods and in the area between Dau Tieng and Ben Suc east of the Saigon River. A coordinated airmobile and ground assault was launched by the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions. The 1st Division launched its attack with its 3d Brigade and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) (1st and 3d Sqdn) which was OPCON to the Division. The 25th Division task organization consisted of the 1st and 2d Brigade and 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division attached. The US Forces were supported by the 34th ARVN Ranger Battalion. It conducted search and destroy operations and established blocking positions in the area. The VC loss of equipment and installations further added to the burden already placed on his logistics system by Operations CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY. Significant VC losses at the end of the reporting period were 106 VC KIA (BC) and 14 PW. They lost 139 individual weapons, 1,089 artillery and mortar rounds, more than 183,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and 267 pounds of documents. 192 tons of rice were evacuated and 196.7 tons destroyed. MANHATTAN continues.

(3) The 1st Australian Task Force initiated Operation PORTSEA at 0700 hours on 21 March supported by US and ARVN troops. The operation was conducted in two phases. Forces employed during Phase I: 1 ATF (-), 1st Sqd 11th ACR, elements of II FFORCEV Engineers, 35th ARVN Ranger Bn and 1/43d ARVN Regt.

During Phase I enemy contact was light and scattered. The highlight of Phase I occurred on 24 March. 81 VC field packs were discovered. One of them contained detailed plans for an attack on Xuyen Moc (YS6668) by the 275th VC Regiment. Countermeasures were

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immediately taken. The discovery of the attack plan was instrumental in thwarting a possible enemy victory.

Phase II of Operation PORTSEA, which began on 3 Apr, was characterized by the rapid deployment and exploitation of the area astride Route 327, north along Route 328 and northwest of Thua Tich (YS 6181). The major arms cache of the operation was discovered on 8 Apr by the 1st Bde, 9th Inf Div. They discovered 81 individual and two crew-served weapons. The Commander, 1st Australian Task Force stated, in effect, "There is no doubt, the 1st Bde participation in Operation PORTSEA severely disrupted the BA Ria Province Organization and the 5th VC Division elements who have so far been able to move through the area with relative impunity." The 1st Bde maintained contact with elements of the 5th VC Division until they were withdrawn to participate in Operation JUNCTION CITY. It was during Phase II that the 43d ARVN Regt protected the exposed flank of the Task Force. It secured the area to the west of Binh Ba against an attack from the 274th VC Regt. With the engineer elements of II FFORCEV, the 1st ATF opened Route 23 from Dat Do to Xuyen Moc. The airfield at Xuyen Moc was repaired and the runway extended to handle CV2 aircraft. Three Regional Forces posts were established in the vicinity of the new bridges across two streams and the Song Rai River. These posts were strongly fortified, and minefields were laid. The opening of Route 23 is considered a major blow to the VC in Phuoc Tuy Province. In conjunction with Operation PORTSEA, the construction of a barbed wire barrier 10km long was started. When completed, it will extend from Horseshoe (YS 4961) to the coast near Phuoc Hai (YS 5153). The barrier will consist of two parallel concertina-type fences. Three, 2-wire, cattle fences are being constructed with a gap between the three fences. Two rolls of concertina wire are being stacked one on the other in each gap. The cattle fences are being connected with baling wire attached at the top of the pickets. Antipersonnel mines with antilift devices will be laid between the fences, except in extremely marshy areas. Wire entanglements will be substituted in those areas. The barrier will serve three primary functions: to deter the VC tax collection effort on Highway 23, to aid in the security of the town of Do Dat, and to deny the Vung Tau area to the VC. To-date the construction has progressed southward from the Horseshoe 5.5 km.

d. Other special operations:

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(1) Operation PALM BEACH was initiated on 28 January by the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. The Brigade is securing the dredging equipment and continuing to develop their base at Dong Tam. On 10 March the 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division assumed operational control of the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry and 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry. Significant statistics for the quarter included 181 VC KIA (BC), 32 PW and 20 individual weapons captured.

(2) Operation ALA MCANA was a 25th Infantry Division search and destroy operation conducted in portions of Hau Nghia, Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces.

(3) Operation WAIALUA was another 25th Infantry Division search and destroy operation. It was conducted in the area southwest of the Oriental River. It succeeded in curtailing Viet Cong actions and freedom of movement between Hau Nghia, Long An and Tay Ninh Provinces.

(4) Operation TUCSON, conducted by the 1st Infantry Division, was a search and destroy operation that uncovered large caches of rice in southwest Binh Long Province.

(5) Operation BIG SPRING was conducted by the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) with the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division under its operational control. The operation was initiated to locate and destroy enemy forces and installations in the western portion of War Zone D.

(6) Operation FAIRFAX is a continuing operation of combined US/ARVN units to counter Viet Cong efforts to re-establish his influence in the areas surrounding Saigon.

e. During the quarter, staff activities were divided into combat developments, distribution and employment of new equipment, force structure and development, and special studies. Continuing projects include maintenance of the II FFORCEV Order of Battle (Incl 2) and the handling of Operational Readiness Reports. Staffing was completed and recommendations were forwarded on the following subjects.

(1) Combat Developments.

(a) XM-27 (Gravel) Mines:

1. A policy was established that the 12th Combat Aviation Group (flying UH-1B & C's) and US Air Force (flying A1-E's)

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would fly all Gravel mine dispensing missions until the dispenser was adapted for the UH-1D. It has been recommended to USARV that each infantry brigade be allocated a supply rate of 20 XM-47 dispensers per month.

2. During the quarter, mine dispensing missions were suspended because a dispenser carried by an A1-E exploded in flight. Major ground combat units were asked to evaluate the Gravel mine. They replied that although solid information on results was lacking, they favored lifting the suspension and continuing use of the mine.

3. In response to a USARV query, II FFORCEV stated that a ground dispenser for Gravel mines was less desirable than the present air dispenser. Air dispensing is faster and better suited to mining targets deep in enemy controlled areas. (Confidential message, II FFORCEV, AVFBC-DOT 40635, DTG 260521Z Apr 67)

(b) Ringtrop: Ringtrop is a self-sterilizing anti-personnel device. When dropped from an aircraft, it lands so that one of its two sharp blades points up. The blades are long enough to penetrate a military boot sole. The blades are chemically treated so that they fall off the device after about 60 days. This headquarters recommended to COMUSMACV suitable locations for evaluating the device. (Secret message, II FFORCEV, AVFBC-DOT 40324, DTG 130255Z Apr 67)

(2) New Equipment.

(a) Riverine Equipment: During the quarter, 9th Infantry Division (with 199th Inf Bde OPCON) requested special equipment for riverine operations. These included:

1. Airscrew Propelled Boats: 44 each, for use four per infantry battalion, two per cavalry troop as high-speed patrol boats. (Confidential message, II FFORCEV, AVFBC-DOT 40365, DTG 150330Z Apr 67)

2. Sixteen ft "Boston Whaler" Shallow Draft Boats: 70 each "Boston Whalers" with 80 HP outboard motors for use as auxiliary boats within the mobile riverine force. (Confidential message, II FFORCEV, AVFBC-DOT 40070, DTG 040045Z Mar 67)

3. Personnel Air Cushion Vehicle (Hovercraft): Minimum of three to be organized into a company for operations similar to air cavalry. (Confidential letter, 9th Infantry Division, AVDE-GT, subject: Organization and Employment of an Air Cushion Vehicle Company (U), undated)

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(b) Lightweight Protective Mask: USARV requested basis of issue for a new silicone rubber gas mask, collapsible to pocket size and protecting only against riot control agents. This headquarters recommended one per footmobile combat soldier. (Unclassified message, II FFORCEV, AVFBC-DOT 40622, DTG 251055Z Apr 67)

(c) M548 Cargo Carrier: This headquarters recommended that M548 tracked cargo carriers be issued first to medium SP artillery, then to 9th Infantry Division S&T Battalion, last to SP heavy artillery. The issue to 9th Division was intended to help them resupply units in inundated areas. (Confidential message, II FFORCEV, AVFBC-DOT 40093, DTG 050120Z Mar 67)

(d) Tunnel Exploration Kit: The kit consists of lights, telephones and small caliber pistols for a two-man tunnel exploration team. Recommended to USARV a basis of issue of one per infantry company/cavalry troop, two per engineer company/chemical detachment. (Confidential letter, II FFORCEV, subject: Tunnel Exploration Kit (U), 2 Mar 67)

(3) Force Structure.

Project OREGON: G1, G3 and G4 coordinated planning and execution of the II FFORCEV portion of Project OREGON, a MACV plan for reinforcing III Marine Amphibious Corps. Planning was conducted in March, and the plans were executed in April.

(4) Special Studies.

(a) Operations in Inundated Areas: In preparation for the 1967 rainy season, a seminar was held by direction of COMUSMACV at HQ II FFORCEV on 13 March 1967. The seminar reviewed experiences in training and operations in inundated areas with brigade and division commanders. Presentations were:

1. Operations in the Rung Sat Special Zone -
1st Infantry Division.

2. Use of River Assault Groups (ARVN) in
Operation CEDAR FALLS - 25th Infantry Division.

3. Operation FAIRFAX - 199th Infantry Brigade
(Lt) (Sep).

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4. CIDG Operations in the Mekong Delta During
the 1966 Floods - 5th SF Gp (Abn).

5. Organization, Training and Planning for
Riverine Operations - 9th Infantry Division.

6. ARVN Armor Operations in the Delta - Senior
Advisor IV Corps.

7. Naval Support for Riverine Operations -
COMNAVFORV.

Presentations were brief and were followed immediately by a discussion period. The discussions were lively and informative. The seminar was successful as a review of past operations and stimulated thinking on future operations.

8. For a detailed synopsis see Inclosure 15.

(b) Sniper Operations: USARV started an evaluation of sniper operations with a staff visit in February to discuss previous sniper operations, sniping equipment on hand and plans for an evaluation of sniping techniques and equipment. II FFORCEV OPCON units had had little experience and less success with sniping. Their equipment was a mixture of M1 and M14 rifles with telescopic sights. ACTIV planned to evaluate four rifles (Winchester Model 70, M16 and accurized M1 and M14) in May and June 1967. II FFORCEV gave USARV a basis of issue for the four rifles to be tested (18 per inf bde). The rifles were issued during April, and on 28 April ACTIV held a meeting of unit representatives to outline the procedures for the evaluation.

(c) Employment of Hoi Chanhs: COMUSMACV requested information on the use of Hoi Chanhs in US combat units. This headquarters replied that Hoi Chanhs have been used in small numbers in PSWAR and intelligence units, in civic action and MEDCAP, and as guides and scouts for infantry. Future use was recommended with a squad of Hoi Chanhs assigned to each US brigade. (Confidential letter, II FFORCEV, subject: Employment of Chieu Hoi (U), 29 Mar 67)

f. With the addition of new units to II FFORCEV, communication requirements have also grown. The arrival of signal units made it possible to provide base camp support for these new units without committing

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additional tactical communication resources. However, there was a slippage in the arrival of signal units. There has also been a slippage in the installation of fixed-plant telephone systems and exterior-plant cable systems. Therefore, a large part of the combat units' communications resources remains committed to the base camps.

g. The tactical communications facilities of the headquarters continued to expand during the quarter. For Operation JUNCTION CITY, a tactical CP was established at Dau Tieng from 21 February to 10 March. The basic concept was sound, and it provided adequate command and control facilities.

5. (C) LOGISTICS:

a. Operations.

(1) Logistical support was focused on the following major operations:

(a) Operation JUNCTION CITY (23 Feb - continuing).

This multidivision operation was initially planned for three phases. Phase I and II were search and destroy operations in War Zone C. Forward support bases were initially established in three locations: Trai Bi (XT 112709), Suoi Da (XT 343578) and the Old French Fort (XT 275683). The 25th Infantry Division was supported from Trai Bi; the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, from the Old French Fort. The 1st Infantry Division and the 173d Airborne Brigade were supported from Suoi Da. 1st Logistical Command could not place stocks at the Old French Fort until it was secured on D+1. COMUSMACV directed that the aerial delivery system be exercised during this operation. There were problems in cargo identification, rigging and recovery of air drop items. These were corrected, and directives were updated (See Section II). 818.5 STON of cargo were successfully dropped. During Phase II, operations shifted to the east in War Zone C. Only two forward support bases were established: Quan Loi (XT 809898) and Suoi Da (XT 343578). The 25th Infantry Division was supported from Suoi Da; the 1st Infantry Division, from Quan Loi. The 173d Airborne Brigade supported itself internally from Minh Thanh with an air line of communication (LOC). The support base at Quan Loi was supplied by both land and air LOC. The 196th Infantry Brigade was supported, to a large degree, by daily air drops. On the average, 60 STON were air dropped daily. This included all classes of supply. The air drop problems encountered during Phase I were negligible during Phase II. Phase III is still in progress; but it has

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been reduced from a multidivision to a brigade-sized operation. It is using the floating brigade concept. The support is being provided by the 1st Logistical Command Supply Point at Tay Ninh and by air drop resupply when appropriate. There are no significant supply problems.

(b) Operation OREGON (8 April - 30 April). This operation required the movement of selected units from the III CTZ to the I CTZ by airlift and sealift. Out-of-country resources of C-130 aircraft and LST's were required to move these units. The move required continuous coordination between the Bien Hoa District Transportation Office/Highway Traffic Center and G4 II FFORCEV. Their collocation greatly assisted in the orderly move of units.

(c) Operation MANHATTAN (23 April - continuing). This is a multidivision airmobile and ground operation. The mission is to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations in the Boi Loi Woods and in the area east of the Saigon River between Dau Tieng and Ben Suc. On D-1, 1st Logistical Command established a forward support base at Dau Tieng. The base supported both the 1st Infantry Division (principally the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment Task Force and artillery units) and elements of the 25th Infantry Division. Other elements of the two divisions are being supported from their permanent division supply points: the 1st Infantry Division from Lai Kai; the 25th Infantry Division from Cu Chi. Throughput of selected artillery ammunition is being made to fire support bases upon request from the divisions. Detailed logistical plans and highway movement control were coordinated at a conference held at this headquarters on D-13. No significant logistical problems have been encountered to date.

b. Transportation.

(1) General. The transportation officer is the coordinator between OPCON units, 1st Logistical Command and US Air Force.

(2) Special interest. Attention continues to be focused on the MACV Highway Traffic Center, collocated at II Field Force. During JUNCTION CITY, a forward traffic center was established at Tay Ninh. It was connected to the II FFORCEV forward CP by a "hot line." On Operation OREGON, the Highway Traffic Center's collocation at II FFORCEV appreciably assisted in the movement of units to I CTZ. The ability to have continual personal contact was invaluable in keeping commanders updated on all movements.

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c. Maintenance.

(1) Engineer Supply and Maintenance Conference. The Conference was held here on 5 April to discuss the repair and support of engineer heavy equipment (HD-16 and D-7 tractors) and the return of that equipment to the using units before Operation MANHATTAN. The conference was chaired by the II FFORCEV Engineer Officer. It was attended by 1st Log Comd, all OPCON unit engineer representatives and the US Army Engineer Command Vietnam (P). For the results of the conference, see Section II: Rome Plows - Jungle Clearing Operations.

(2) General Supply and Maintenance Conference. The Conference was held at Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command on 13 April 1967. It was chaired by 1st Logistical Command and was attended by all OPCON units and II FFORCEV G4 representatives. The relationships between unit organic supply and maintenance organizations and their counterparts in 1st Log Comd support organizations was discussed. The established supply and maintenance channels from the units to 1st Log Comd agencies was also discussed. Additionally, several subjects were emphasized: the need for accuracy, timeliness and correct procedures in evacuation of repairables; supply procedures; and unit requisitioning procedures. Present and future supply status of selected items of equipment was announced for future planning.

(3) Mechanical Maintenance. During this quarter, artillery and tank deadline rates became excessively high. USARV is now requiring a daily deadline report on both these items. Artillery was first placed under this reporting system; and because of the success of the program, it was decided to include tanks. At the end of the reporting period, deadline rates had been markedly reduced. It is to be expected that other high deadline items will be controlled through this program.

(4) Material Readiness. This program continues to be effective: all assigned and attached units have low deadline rates on all equipment, except aircraft.

d. Status of Primary Land LOC's as of 30 April.

(1) For the purpose of this report, the following terms on condition of land LOC's are defined.

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(a) Condition I: The route is capable of carrying up to Class 50 loads (all division loads).

(b) Condition II: Up to Class 30 loads (the majority of logistical transport e.g., 5000-gallon POL tankers).

(c) Condition III: Up to Class 16 loads (Armored Personnel Carriers and 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks).

(d) Condition IV: Can carry only light civilian traffic; therefore, it is open only to light reconnaissance vehicles.

(e) Condition V: Closed to all traffic

(2) Route QL-1.

(a) Cambodian Border (XT 284244) to Go Dau Ha (XT 382250), lowest bridge capacity, Class 12, route condition III.

(b) Go Dau Ha (XT 382250) to Cu Chi (XT 628126), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

(c) Cu Chi (XT 628126) to Saigon (XS 793942), lowest bridge capacity, Class 60, route condition I.

(d) Saigon (XS 793942) to RJ 316 (YT 072130), lowest bridge capacity, Class 40, route condition II.

(e) RJ 316 (YT 072130) to (YT 697026), lowest bridge capacity, Class 45, route condition II.

(f) YT 697026 to III CTZ Boundary (ZT 180014), bridge destroyed, route condition V.

(3) Route QL-4.

(a) RJ QL-1 (XS 845914) to (XS 423490), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

(b) XS 423490 to Tien Giang River (WS 985357), lowest bridge capacity, Class 15, route condition III.

(4) Route QL-13.

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(a) RJ QL-1 (XS 879971) to bridge at (XT 767619), lowest bridge capacity, Class 40, route condition II.

(b) Bridge at (XT 767619) to Cambodian Border (XU 683233), lowest bridge capacity, Class 15, route condition III.

(5) Route QL-14.

(a) Dong Xoai (YT 079759) to blown bridge at (YT 165820 - repair easy w/fill), lowest bridge capacity, Class 30, route condition II. Condition will continue until the road is opened by tactical force and repairs can be made.

(b) Route condition II continues to the destroyed bridge at YU 303010. From YU 303010 to the II - III CTZ Boundary (YU 590176) the road is accessible from II CTZ, lowest bridge capacity, Class 30, route condition II.

(6) Route QL-15.

(a) Bien Hoa (YT 002114) to (YS 151891), lowest bridge capacity, Class 60, route condition I.

(b) (YS 151891) to Baria (YS 380607), lowest bridge capacity, Class 20 (with by-pass fords), route condition III.

(c) Baria (YS 380607) to Vung Tau (YS 274444), lowest bridge capacity, Class 12, route condition IV.

(7) Route QL-20.

(a) RJ QL-1 (YT 343101) to bridge at YT 537356, lowest bridge capacity, Class 37, route condition II.

(b) Bridge at YT 537356 to III CTZ Boundary (YT 763572), lowest bridge capacity, Class 25, route condition III.

(8) Route QL-22.

(a) Go Dau Ha (XT 387251) to Tay Ninh (XT 198508), lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

(b) Tay Ninh (XT 198508) to XT 097764, lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I.

(c) XT 097764 to Cambodian Border (XT 074896) with AVLB abutments prepared at XT 097764, route condition V; with AVLB, route condition I.

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(9) Route LTL 1-A.

(a) Phu Cuong (XT 81140) to RJ LTL-16 (XT 887373), bridge destroyed, route condition V.

(b) RJ LTL-16 (XT 887373) to XT 995588, lowest bridge capacity, Class 50, route condition I. (Road cratered at this point).

(c) XT 995588 to RJ 311 (YU 133062), bridge destroyed, route condition V.

(d) RJ 311 (YU 133062) to RJ QL-14A (XU 960221), lowest bridge capacity, Class 15, route condition IV.

(10) Route LTL-2.

RJ (YT 437045) to Ba Ria (YS 380607), lowest bridge capacity, Class 60, route condition I.

(11) Route LTL-5A.

Saigon (XS 816890) to III CTZ Boundary (XS 786568), lowest bridge capacity, Class 16, route condition III.

a. Construction Programmed.

(1) Surface maintenance, drainage repair and reconstruction is being pursued actively on the following routes: QL-1, QL-22, QL-13, LTL-16 and QL-20. Repair consists of reworking rutted surfaces and, where necessary, the subgrade and complete rehabilitation. The Minister of Public Works is the primary agency involved in this effort with assistance from ARVN and US Engineers. Programmed repairs are nearly completed on QL-20 in Long Khanh Province and QL-13 from Phu Cuong to Lai Khe. They anticipate starting repair on LTL-16 in the near future. Work continues on the major effort required on QL-1 and QL-22 from Saigon to Tay Ninh.

(2) During the next quarter and throughout the year, ARVN engineer effort will consist mainly of replacing bridges that are incapable of handling sustained military traffic. Materials will be provided by the USAECV (P). ARVN will repair the bridges on QL-1 and QL-22 and rebuild LTL-1A from Phu Cuong to Phuoc Vinh. Repair of bridges on QL-1 and QL-22 will release 1 AVLB and 40 meters of Double-Double Panel Bridge currently in place.

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(3) The US engineer effort on land LOC's will continue to open and improve routes in support of tactical operations and provide emergency repair where necessary. As programmed engineer construction assets arrive in-country, a larger portion of the overall effort will be devoted to permanent rehabilitation of major land LOC's.

6. (FOUO) REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD)

a. (FOUO) Significant progress in evaluating the RD program.

(1) The Hamlet Evaluation Report was initiated in January at the request of the Secretary of Defense. The report established a yard-stick by which the MACV Sector and Sub-Sector Advisors could evaluate each hamlet in their area. The advisors submit the report to MACV/RD Support Directorate. The data is reduced by ADP. A composite print-out is distributed to ACofS, RD, II FFORCEV; RD Advisor at III Corps Advisory Detachment; Office of Civil Operation for Region III and to the Sector/Sub-Sector Advisors.

(2) Sector and Sub-Sector Advisors evaluate the status of each hamlet in their area using two categories: security and development. Three factors are used to evaluate each category.

(a) The adviser evaluates the factors of hamlet security using three indicators for each.

1. He judges the VC's ability to conduct military operations in the hamlet area and reports the scale and frequency of VC military incidents that affect security of the hamlet.

2. He evaluates the VC political and subversive activities and their effect on the hamlet.

3. The advisor then evaluates the friendly defensive and security capabilities. The three indicators he uses are: the willingness of the people to report VC activities; the ability of the hamlet to defend itself; and the availability of RVNAF, US/FWMAF reaction forces, artillery and air support.

(b) The advisor uses three factors to evaluate hamlet development.

1. He assesses the status of the local government and political development.

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2. He evaluates the improvement of social conditions as evidenced by progress in health, education and welfare development. He assesses the extent to which medical services are provided and the degree of acceptance of the new health and sanitation practices. He reports the number of adequate schools. He evaluates the extent to which the people's basic welfare needs are being met by GVN.

3. The advisor reports on the amount of economic effort being expended, its effectiveness and the degree to which it is supported and appreciated by the people. The three indicators he uses are: the extent to which the people are working on simple, short term projects to improve private and public facilities; the extent of public works projects and their benefit to the people; the extent to which GVN ministries are helping and the extent of the people's interest and participation in the GVN economic improvement programs.

b. (U) Significant Psychological Operation Activities.

(1) The number of PSYOP air missions increased in the past quarter as a result of continued emphasis. The number rose from 1,066 to a new high of 1,392.

(2) The number of air delivered leaflets and airborne loudspeaker operations also increased. The hours of loudspeaker operations rose to 844 as compared with 682 for the previous quarter. Over a million more leaflets were air delivered this quarter (194,994,000 as compared with 108,669,000). The 246th PSYOP Company, the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions produced 10 million more leaflets than last quarter (53,276,000 vs 43,816,000). The 6th PSYOP Battalion and other off-shore agencies furnished more than 5 million leaflets for distribution in the III CTZ this quarter (5,259,550).

(3) The 246th PSYOP Company has supported US/FWMAF operations in the III CTZ with ten mobile loudspeaker teams. The company is normally authorized equipment and personnel for only four teams. Six additional teams were fielded despite an acute shortage of equipment and personnel.

(4) During the quarter, 2,577 Hoi Chanh were reported in the III CTZ. This is a substantial increase over the last reporting period's total of 1,419. During the TST period alone, 1,146 Hoi Chanh returned to GVN control. The provinces with the most significant increases were: Long An with 765; Gia Dinh 344; Hau Nghia 317; and Binh Duong 306.

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c. (U) Significant Civil Affairs Activities.

(1) The 2d Civil Affairs Company has completed deployment of its teams. The company was reorganized into 14 AA platoons. One platoon was attached to each brigade-size unit OPCON to II FFORCEV. The teams have completed 19 hamlet surveys. They also provided civil affairs support for Operations JUNCTION CITY, FAIRFAX, ENTERPRISE, MAKALAPA and PORTSEA.

(2) Unit commanders have continued to emphasize civic action even though their units were engaged in continuous offensive operations during the past three months.

(3) MEDCAP II continued throughout the II Field Force area of operation treating an average of 38,130 patients monthly.

(4) English language instruction has shown a continuous rise in the number of students attending classes and number of classes held. US Army personnel taught an average of 2,341 Vietnamese students per month.

7. (U) INFORMATION.

a. During Operation JUNCTION CITY, a press camp was established in the II FFORCEV tactical CP area. It was staffed by the Information Officer, his deputy, drivers and clerks. The CO of the 16th Public Information Detachment acted as transportation coordinator for all air movement of correspondents. MACV stationed a clearance officer on-site to expedite clearance of Army generated news stories, radio tapes and pictures. A photo van with a photo processing team was attached from the 53d Signal Battalion. This enabled on-site processing and release of newsworthy photographs. Seventy newsmen used the press camp which had sleeping and messing facilities. They were given operational briefings and afforded interviews with the Commanding General and key staff officers when requested. They were furnished air transportation to key operational units of their choice.

b. During Operation MANHATTAN, II FFORCEV did not establish a forward CP; this negated the usefulness of a forward press camp. Therefore, all correspondents who desired to cover the operation were gathered on D-1 by the MACV Office of Information. Twenty-three correspondents were taken to a secure location at Tan Son Nhut Air Base.

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Prior to receiving any information about the operation, they were told that they were "locked in" and that they could not return to their office or talk to anyone in Saigon. They were further cautioned that all news and information about the operation was under embargo until MACV had officially announced the start of the operation. After they had agreed to these conditions, the II FFORCEV Information Officer presented a short operational briefing outlining the general scheme of maneuver. Correspondents were then taken immediately to waiting aircraft and escorted to the division of their choice. No other correspondents were invited to MANHATTAN until MACV had officially announced the operation. Correspondents were then afforded a briefing at Long Binh prior to entering the operational area.

8. (U) INSPECTOR GENERAL.

a. Four complaints and 28 requests for assistance were received. No unfavorable trends are indicated.

b. Three investigations were conducted.

c. Four units received their annual IG inspections.

9. (U) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE.

a. On 31 March a command letter was published announcing the policy of the United States Government in regards to court-martial jurisdiction over civilians.

b. On 3 April a command letter was published to assist all eligible alien servicemen in obtaining United States citizenship.

c. On 17 April the CG, II FFORCEV, signed a Law Day Proclamation in observance of the tenth anniversary of Law Day, USA.

d. On 17 April Information Bulletin Number 1 was published. This bulletin is the first in a series. The bulletin informs commanders and their personnel about matters relating to military justice, claims and legal assistance. (Incl 10)

e. On 21 April a confidential command letter was published, subject: War Crimes and Atrocities (U).

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f. Following units were assigned to II FFORCEV for GCM jurisdiction.

(1) Battery I (Searchlight), 29th Artillery was assigned to II Field Force Vietnam on GO 1445, USARV, 31 Mar 67, and further attached to 5th Bn (AW) (SP), 2d Arty on GO 601, II FFORCEV, 14 Apr 67. Both orders had an effective date of 27 Mar 67.

(2) 1st Howitzer Battalion (155mm) (SP), 27th Artillery, was assigned to 23d Artillery Group on GO 1815, USARV, 20 Apr 67, with an effective date of 13 Apr.

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SECTION II: COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PERSONNEL

Item: Disease.

Discussion: The number of malaria cases has been relatively small during this period. Since malaria is a "seasonal" disease, this should not result in complacency. Approximately 30 cases of infectious hepatitis have occurred in OPCON units in the past three months. Despite intensive epidemiological studies, no final conclusions have been reached. Venereal disease rates have shown only minor fluctuations. With the present degree and type of command interest in this problem, personnel continue to report for treatment in the early stages of the disease.

Observation: Continued command emphasis on sanitation and malaria discipline is essential to maintain the health of the command. In previous quarterly periods, excessive command interest in VD has driven the disease underground. This is to be avoided.

Item: Aeromedical evacuation (Dust Off).

Discussion: An additional four helicopters have been assigned to the air ambulance unit (18 to 22). The four additional aircraft has allowed a corresponding increase in aircraft available for prepositioned tactical support (Stand-by).

Observation: Even though helicopter ambulances are single purpose aircraft, the allocation of these aircraft must be increased as the number of combat units increases. The number of such aircraft must also be increased when the tactical situation precludes use of ground ambulances for evacuation of patients from divisions and between hospitals.

Item: Effective IG system.

Discussion: The development of a dynamic IG system in combat units is essential to the effective conduct of counterinsurgency operations. The unprecedented psychological pressures placed on individual soldiers requires an "escape-valve" mechanism to assist the commander in resolving minor problems before they become major problems. The IG acts as a trouble-shooter for the Chief of Staff and Commanding General; this permits them to devote their attention to winning the war.

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Observation: To be effective, IG positions in combat units must be manned at full strength with school-trained personnel of the highest caliber who have extensive combat experience.

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Item: Infrared.

Discussion: Infrared aerial surveillance continues to produce valuable information on possible enemy location and activity. However, difficulty in discrimination continues to be a problem. Fires may be enemy, friendly or simply agricultural burn-off or wood clearing operations. Residual fires from artillery and air strikes also make discrimination difficult.

Observation: For discrimination to be effective, the interpreter must be fully informed on the location of all fires, joke ovens, and friendly activity. When a return does not match the known sources, it is suspect. Artillery may be fired against the source of the infrared return. This is usually followed by a visual aerial or ground reconnaissance. The results obtained build experience factors that are applied to future infrared returns.

Item: Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR).

Discussion: SLAR reconnaissance continues to be successful, to a degree, in the III CTZ. The heavy jungle and hilly terrain denies much of the area to complete SLAR coverage. The VC transport supplies and personnel in small, slow moving vehicles; and this limits detection by SLAR. Careful, accurate interpretation of SLAR imagery with extreme attention to detail is required. However, the possibility of over-interpretation by eager interpreters must be recognized.

Observation: Not all SLAR returns represent movement; not all are VC. To effectively discriminate a careful analysis is made by the Aerial Reconnaissance Officer at all command levels. Returns in areas of known friendly or civilian activity are simply noted. Remaining returns are carefully analyzed to establish patterns of VC activity during curfew hours. Artillery may be fired against returns which are suspect. This is usually followed by a visual aerial or ground reconnaissance. The results obtained build experience factors that are applied to future SLAR returns.

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OPERATIONS

Item: B-52 Strikes.

Discussion: Previously B-52 strikes had been primarily used to destroy lucrative targets developed by intelligence. With the increase in large offensive operations in this quarter, there was an increase in unit requests for B-52 strikes in support of ground operations. When units began using B-52 strikes as an extension of planned tactical air and artillery, staff responsibility was transferred from G-2 to G-3.

Observation: As a result, ground follow-up actions have been more frequent and damage assessments more timely.

Item: Pink Rose III Operation.

Discussion: The operation's objective was to burn large areas of jungle growth. The area was bounded by coordinates XT 105765, XT 104781, XT 145767 and XT 145784 and involved about 17 square kilometers. It was treated with the herbicide agent, Orange, to kill the foliage. Spraying by C-123 aircraft was completed o/a 24 Jan. Target response to herbicide was normal, and target coverage was approximately 80%. Fifteen B-52s, each carrying 42 M35 incendiary bomb clusters, delivered their munitions 041400 Apr on target. Weather forecast for the day included 3,000' ceilings; broken clouds, 4/10 - 6/10 cover; three mile visibility; and 1500' ceiling was expected in the target area between 1500 - 1900 hours. Actual weather in the area at the TOT included cumulus clouds at 3,000' and cloud cover of approximately 6/10. No sustained fire developed; however, some underbrush was burned. Reasonably round areas, about 20 feet in diameter, were burned thoroughly. No significant overlapping of these areas occurred. Three secondary explosions occurred. Whether this was caused by striking VC supplies and/or incendiary bomblets exploding was not determined.

Observation: It appears that the area was as dry as could be expected. A large portion of the target foliage was dead. Munitions were delivered accurately, but a sustained fire did not develop. The current concept and/or equipment used will not accomplish the desired result. If this objective is to be pursued, consideration should be given to delivery of a flammable agent after the incendiary clusters are delivered. Research and development problems would include development of an adequate disseminating system that places the agent in the target area under lapse conditions.

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Item: Friendly casualties from fire support continue.

Discussion: Dense foliage and enemy hugging tactics make contact at very close ranges common. Artillery and air support is important and frequently decisive in these sharp, short fire-fights. Infantry leaders down to the squad level must be fully qualified to adjust artillery fire under these conditions. They should be familiar with requesting USAF and Army air strikes. Adjustment of artillery by sound, creeping adjustment, radio telephone procedures, land navigation and techniques for marking friendly positions are some of the subjects that need emphasis. The most important training subject, however, is the actual practice of adjusting close artillery and air strikes. This needs to be done realistically in training of leaders, in unit training and in maneuvers.

Observation: Individual replacements and troop units are arriving in Vietnam inadequately trained in the practical application of close fire support.

Item: Inadequate infantry training of non-combat specialists.

Discussion: The security requirements in Vietnam make every soldier a part-time infantryman. Men from every unit, shop, and office at every level and type of organization find themselves manning positions in base defense; "riding shotgun" in convoys; and, at times, performing short-range patrolling. As a bare minimum, all soldiers must be familiar with light infantry weapons, night vision devices, field communications equipment, and techniques of defense and patrolling. Advanced individual training and specialist training is apparently not devoting enough time to these subjects because soldiers are forgetting what they learned in basic training.

Observation: One result has been a loss of effectiveness in the security of support and service installations. Another, has been the unnecessary friendly casualties caused by accidental discharging of weapons and unsafe techniques of challenging by security guards.

Item: Unsuitable boats and motors for Riverine Operations.

Discussion: The standard Engineer boats and motors were designed for river crossings, not for Riverine Operations. Units have attempted to use standard engineer equipment for operations in Gia Dinh, Long An, and Dinh Tuong Provinces and the Rung Sat Special Zone. These attempts have failed. The aluminum one-half pontoons sink when they are hit by small-arms fire. The hull is too weak to withstand the strain of repeated beachings. The 16 foot, plastic assault boats with 25HP motors are too slow. They are used to carry troops and habitually operate in streams that are frequently ambushed by the VC. The 25HP motor is too small for most purposes. It is

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also mechanically unreliable: it frequently fails and has a high dead-line rate.

Observation: Troops regularly engaged in Riverine Operations have had to request civilian boats through the slow, expensive ENSURE program. Other troops have borrowed USN, Transportation Corps, and ARVN boats or have had to use the unsuitable engineer boats.

Item: Separate brigade forward area signal platoon.

Discussion: Two of the separate brigades deployed to Vietnam without their normal forward area signal platoon. A composite signal platoon was organized from the 36th Signal Battalion (CA) to provide interim support for the 199th Infantry Brigade (Lt), but this prevented the establishment of radio relay systems between base camps. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep) was supported by a provisional detachment organized from the 53d Signal Battalion (Corps). This left the signal battalion with insufficient operational spares. During Operation JUNCTION CITY, radio relay and carrier equipment had to be borrowed from the 2d Signal Group to augment communications for the II FFORCEV tactical CP.

Observation: When it is necessary to deploy a unit without its organic signal support, sufficient resources exist in-country to provide interim support. However, these provisional communications support packages tend to degrade the flexibility of tactical signal units.

Item: Excessive number of messages with Immediate Precedence.

Discussion: During this quarter, more than 119,000 messages were transmitted electrically. Eighty percent of these messages were classed as Immediate. This disproportionate volume of high precedence traffic handicaps the message handling system. When most of the messages being received at a relay or terminal are the same high precedence, there is no way in which they can be given expeditious service. For example, as a matter of policy, all preplanned air strike requests are assigned an Immediate precedence. If Routine would suffice in some of the cases, this would expedite the transmission of those truly Immediate messages.

Observation: Precedence should be assigned as required by the content of the message rather than on general categories. The practice of assigning a precedence to a message because of its category, rather than its content, should be reviewed.

Item: Complaints that the KY-8 diminishes the range of the radio circuit.

Discussion: During Operation CEDAR FALLS, many commanders used the KY-8 for the first time to provide secure voice transmissions. Several

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complained about a definite loss of signal strength and range. Commanders were reminded that more voltage and amperage are required when using the KY-8. Generators and storage batteries supplying the current to key the KY-8 must be maintained at near full-capacity. When this is done, the signal strength and range will remain the same, even with the additional voltage load placed on the system by the use of the KY-8.

Observation: During training, operators must be reminded that near capacity voltage in-put must be maintained for maximum operating efficiency. This is particularly true when additional load demands are placed on the system. Further, more vehicular installation kits are needed to provide secure voice transmissions when speed and security are equally essential.

Item: Voice and teletypewriter circuits between logistical support operations center and their forward support base.

Discussion: The establishment of forward support bases by the 15th Support Brigade to supply tactical elements during Operation JUNCTION CITY imposed increased demands on the tactical communications. The 15th Support Brigade has no organic communications capability. Therefore, it is dependent on the divisions and II FFORCEV for this support.

Observation: The logistical support brigades should be given an organic signal support unit.

Item: Frequency interference between VHF aircraft radios and AN/TRC-24 radio relay equipment.

Discussion: The concurrent use of frequencies in the VHF band by aircraft and for radio relay has made it extremely difficult for signal units to operate at extended ranges with the AN/TRC-24 because of frequency interference. The AN/TRC-24 was designed to operate approximately 30 miles. However in the III CTZ, there are no significant hill sites within this range. Therefore, it has been necessary to operate systems up to 90 miles from a major relay site. Because of the extended range, there is a definite loss in signal strength; and the system is extremely vulnerable to interference from aircraft radios.

Observation: AN/TRC-24 tuning heads for frequencies above 300 mcs or the substitution of the newer, improved AN/GRC-50 radio relay equipment is needed to solve this problem.

Item: Frequency over-crowding.

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Discussion: There are 92 frequencies available in the 30 to 52 mcs band. The Free World Military Forces in the III CTZ operate 452 FM radios within this one frequency band. Result: too few frequencies for too many radios. Further, all nets use aircraft radios as one or more stations. The use of normal aircraft radios with an output of only 7-10 watts does not create as much of a problem as command consoles do. The AN/VRC-46 (aircraft mounted command consoles) generates an output of 35 watts when operated on high power. The problem of too many radios and radios operated unnecessarily on high power is further compounded by a common failure -- poor radio-telephone procedure and unnecessary chatter.

Observation: Communications procedures and discipline must be stressed during training. Command consoles should be operated on low power unless effective communications cannot be established.

SUPPLY/MAINTENANCE

Item: Aerial Delivery Resupply.

Discussion: Some difficulties arose when the Aerial Delivery System was exercised during Operation JUNCTION CITY. Free fall of bundles, inaccurate drops, dented metal 105mm containers (making it impossible to remove the round) and lack of cargo manifests were major problem areas.

Observation: There was an apparent weakness in the webbing of some air dropped items. The opening shock tore the webbing, allowing the cargo to fall free. A close check of webbing on subsequent drops was made with no recurrence of this difficulty. Ammunition in metal containers came from pre-rigged stocks. This problem was overcome when wooden containers were used. Pilots now have a manifest giving the contents of each bundle of cargo and the drop sequence. The pilot informs the ground commander. The commander can then make a decision on the advisability of recovering bundles that fall outside the drop zone.

Item: PLL of Spare Parts.

Discussion: One infantry division arrived in-country with a double issue of spare parts for aircraft. During the past 14 months, they have used these spare parts as required. However, they failed to record demand data and establish a continual flow of parts through normal supply channels.

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Observation: Because of procurement lead-time and the magnitude of repair parts needed for aircraft, it is imperative that units comply with section VI, AR 735-35. This requires that a PLL be established and maintained as soon as they arrive in RVN. By a shift in priorities, spare parts were made available to the division. This did, to a degree, alleviate the situation.

Item: Individual Equipment, TA 50-901.

Discussion: A shortage of TA 50-901 items continues to exist due primarily to the constant flow of replacements from CONUS.

Observation: This situation will continue until the troop buildup diminishes or until the availability of items equals the demand.

Item: Failure to Justify Ammunition Expenditures in Excess of Available Supply Rate (ASR).

Discussion: During and after completion of Operation JUNCTION CITY, all units failed to report and justify the expenditures of ammunition in excess of the ASR, except one. That unit submitted justification for its excessive usage of yellow and violet smoke grenades; it was forwarded to USARV. This resulted in an increased ASR for the theater, and the grenades were flown in by special airlift. On 5 May these grenades were removed from ASR control.

Observation: This headquarters can obtain additional allocations from USARV provided units report and justify expenditures in excess of the ASR.

Item: Rome Plows - Jungle Clearing Operations.

Discussion: During Operations CEDAR FALLS, JUNCTION CITY and MANHATTAN extensive jungle clearing operations were conducted. The medium tractor, D-7 or HD-16, is the standard tractor for the Rome Plow attachments. During these operations, the Rome Plows were used to clear large tracts of land. They encountered heavy jungle growth: trees 18-36 inches in diameter with 100-150 foot high canopies. The trees were surrounded by thick secondary growth. As a result of these operations, several lessons were learned.

Observation: FIELD MODIFICATIONS - The hydraulic hose to the tilt cylinder for a bull blade is longer than necessary for the Rome Plow.

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It was shortened to reduce exposure to cutting. The anti-freeze thermostats are not needed in Vietnam; therefore, they were removed. The rear screen on the cab needed reinforcing to prevent its being ripped when backing into heavy growth. In addition to field modification of the rear screen, a DA Form 2407 (Equipment Improvement Request) is being submitted.

Observation: EQUIPMENT OPERATION - While clearing jungle growth, operators learned to never exceed second gear for short passes and to use first gear for long passes. When clearing heavy jungle growth, the tractor runs hot. This overheating can cause cracked heads, blown gaskets and extreme engine wear. Operators learned to be especially alert to this hazard. When extremely large trees were encountered (36 inches in diameter or larger), they were by-passed and left for demolitions teams. Regular dozers do not have a protective cab; therefore, they must not be used in the same area while Rome Plows are felling tall trees. However, this slows down the clearing operation and retards the tactical operational schedule. The engineer units are fabricating safety cabs for the regular dozers; in addition, they are submitting a DA Form 2407.

Observation: OPERATOR MAINTENANCE - Dirt, leaves and jungle growth clog the radiators and covers the engine. To preclude fire and to aid cooling, the radiators and engine housing must be blown out frequently using an air compressor. The dozer belly pan must be removed daily to remove accumulated dirt and leaves. Part of this problem was caused when some dozers were shipped to Vietnam with the pull-type fan (winter fan). This pulls the jungle debris into the radiator and around the engine. The push-type fan is being requisitioned. Further, a larger radiator is needed for the D-7. A DA Form 2407 is being submitted.

Observation: ASL (Authorized Stockage Levels) - Because of the heavy work load and long operating schedules, supply of repair parts and maintenance are critical. Radiators, filters, air cleaners, turbo chargers, hydraulic hoses and cleat bolts are especially critical. They need frequent replacement. Stockage levels must be maintained higher than for conventional tractor operations. Therefore, unit ASLs must be increased when they anticipate extensive jungle clearing operations.

Observation: MAINTENANCE SUPPORT - Contact teams must be employed at each work site or flown in from a central location by helicopter to

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make immediate repairs. Further, periodic maintenance halts must be scheduled for operator maintenance. Tractors should be brought into a central location for this maintenance, so contact teams can assist the operators. Welding equipment and air compressors must be available for preventive repairs.

Observation: CONTROL - When Rome Flows operate singly and in dense jungle growth, control is extremely difficult. The operators are given radios, and numbers are painted on the cab roofs. The supervisor controls their movement from a helicopter using compass headings for directional control. Radios for this purpose are not included in the unit TOE. Engineer units are studying the problem to determine the feasibility of submitting an MPOE requesting one radio per dozer and Rome Flow for this purpose.

Item: High Deadline Rate for Base Power Generators.

Discussion: A considerable number of nonstandard generators were brought in-country by units to fill TOE shortages; some, in excess of authorized allowances. Many of these were commercial or obsolete generators; therefore, the necessary repair parts are not available through the normal supply channels. The standardization program, outlined in USARV Reg 750-21, 17 Jan 67, has not been implemented because replacement generators have not arrived from CONUS. It has been requested that DA place generators under the Closed Loop Program, thereby insuring a one-for-one replacement.

Tactical generators, 1.5 to 45 KW, were not designed nor intended to be used to furnish base camps with electricity. Many of these generators are being used for this purpose on a 24 hour, 7 day-a-week schedule. This abnormal operating schedule has directly contributed to the high deadline rate. This has exceeded the projected usage rate and created a critical shortage of spare parts.

Observation: Generators, 60 KW and above, are capable of providing base camps with dependable power. These generators have now been removed from the G-4 tactical requirements channel. The responsibility for these generators has been transferred to the Engineer R&U Section of 1st Log Comd.

Item: Replacement of the M113 with the M113A1 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC).

Discussion: During a three month period, 316 APC were destroyed by VC mines, recoilless rifles and RPG-2. This indicates the increasing emphasis the VC is placing on the destruction of armored vehicles. Of the APC

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damaged, 193 or 61 percent were totally destroyed. Examination of the vehicles and observer-reports indicate that many of the APC were destroyed, nor directly by enemy action, but by the flash fire that resulted when the gas tanks and fuel lines were ruptured. A large number of the wounded and killed in the APC were victims of the flash fire, not enemy action.

Observation: The M113A1 is diesel powered; therefore, it is not as vulnerable to flash fire.

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

Item: Improvement of PSYOP Material for Use Against the Viet Cong.

Discussion: Through interrogations of Hoi Chanh, it has been learned that elimination of certain objectionable material would greatly improve the effectiveness of propaganda leaflets. Two of the most important observations made by the Hoi Chanh are:

a. Caricatures and cartoons which ridicule or degrade individuals serving in the Viet Cong forces tend to antagonize the target audience and lessen the credibility and overall effectiveness of the leaflets.

b. Many local VC do not like to be called by the term "Viet Cong." They do not consider themselves Communists but fighters for the National Liberation Front.

Observation: In the development of leaflets for psychological operations, extreme care must be exercised to provide accurate and credible propaganda which does not antagonize the target audience. Psychologically correct terminology must be developed to address specific target audiences.

Item: Critical shortage of Vietnamese language qualified personnel in PSYOP units.

Discussion: The psychological operations company supporting II FFORCEV does not have any qualified Vietnamese linguists. This situation inhibits the development of effective propaganda material by otherwise well-trained US personnel. In every case, the translation and interpretation of propaganda material must be accomplished by Vietnamese linguists. The PSYOP unit does not have the capability to check on the accuracy or appropriateness of the translation.

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Observation: To insure credible propaganda, US psychological operations personnel must be trained in the native language of the area.

Item: VC Countermeasures to the Chieu Hoi Program.

Discussion: Interrogation of ralliers and captured enemy documents reveals an active program by the VC to counter the Chieu Hoi Program.

Observation: The Chieu Hoi Program must be implemented in strict accordance with policies and promises announced by the GVN. Any failure to follow the announced program provides the VC with valuable propaganda and permits him to effectively counter Chieu Hoi propaganda. When GVN promises to VC ralliers are not kept, the entire Chieu Hoi Program suffers.

Item: Civil Affairs/Civic Action Surveys.

Discussion: These surveys conducted in hamlets often contain significant intelligence, such as the names of local leaders, VC taxation rates and local terrain information.

Observation: Civil Affairs Surveys should be furnished to appropriate intelligence agencies. MACV Sector and Sub-Sector Advisors should receive a copy of surveys conducted in their areas. Copies of Civil Affairs/Civic Action Surveys are being provided to G2, II FFORCEV.

Item: Hamlet Evaluation Survey.

Discussion: The statistics provided by the monthly report proved to be a valuable source of information to the Revolutionary Development staff in monitoring the R/D progress. The report identifies hamlets where the relationships between the civilian and military forces (RVNAF or US/FWMAF) needed improvement and indicates the cause. It was readily apparent that the report contained valuable information for intelligence staffs at all levels. The report has the most complete list available of the villages and hamlets in the III CTZ. It also provided the first detailed evaluation of the effectiveness of the VC guerrilla force and infrastructure at the hamlet level. The combat commander should also have access to this information.

Observation: II FFORCEV G-2 has the information available. Beginning with the May report, extracts of the ADP print-out will be distributed to division and separate brigades covering their area of interest.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

Item: Better Utilization of Captured Food.

Discussion: In some instances food and supplies captured from enemy forces are destroyed. This material should be given to local GVN officials for use in district and province relief programs. Local Chieu Hoi and refugee centers can also use captured commodities.

Observation: Food should not be destroyed until coordination has been made with the Office of Civil Operations representatives because they can often assist in evacuation. Food commodities should not be burned or destroyed until authority has been granted from the appropriate headquarters. In the case of large food caches, final decision on destruction will be made by MACV only.

INFORMATION

Item: News Exploitation.

Discussion: An atrocity committed by the Viet Cong at Suoi Chan, killing members of a Revolutionary Development team, was expeditiously reported the same day to news media. Photos taken by advisors on the scene were rushed, still undeveloped, to the Information Office. A story with pictures was forwarded for distribution to news media in time for them to file their story that same day. As a result, excellent and timely press coverage provided full exposure of heinous acts by the VC against civilians of the RVN.

Observation: This war is the most photographed conflict in history; almost every soldier has a camera. This vast resource of photos can only be tapped by a vigorous campaign to insure that every soldier is public information oriented. Information Specialists who arrive on-the-scene, after the fact, must seek out these potential picture sources. All personnel must be encouraged to take photos of newsworthy events and immediately forward unprocessed film to the nearest Information Office for processing and immediate relay to MACV Information Office for clearance.


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AVR-1
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 30 April 1967
(RCS CORON-6) (U)

15 May 1967

Item: Commander's Recommendations.

NONE.



FRED C. WEYAND
Major General, USA
Acting Commander

AVTCS-11

15 May 1965

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1965
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

DISTRIBUTION:

- 3 - ACSFOR, DA
- 1 - CINFOUSARPAC
- 5 - CG, USARV
- 1 - ACoFS, G1, II FFORCEV
- 1 - ACoFS, G2, II FFORCEV
- 10 - ACoFS, G3, II FFORCEV
- 1 - ACoFS, G4, II FFORCEV
- 1 - ACoFS, G5, II FFORCEV
- 5 - 7th MIL Hist Det
- 1 - CG, USAIS
- 1 - CG, USAARMS
- 1 - CG, USAAFS
- 1 - CG, USACGSC
- 1 - CG, USAINFBRU

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OPERATIONAL REPORT (OR) 100-100
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
30 April 1967 (RCS 100-100-100) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 0 AUG 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Force Development, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-
Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1967 from Headquarters,
II Field Force Vietnam.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning aeromedical evacuation, page 40:
Concur. Approved troop programming for USAFV includes additional medical
air ambulances for arrival in-country during CY 67. Although these air-
craft will increase the aeromedical evacuation capability of medical
air ambulance units, it is envisioned that some aeromedical evacuation
requirements will continue to be accomplished by operational aircraft
when the tactical situation dictates their use in emergency situations.

b. Reference item concerning unsuitable boats and motors for
Riverine Operation, page 43: Concur. Boston Whalers ordered through
the ENSURE system are arriving with 40 HP engines.

c. Reference item concerning aerial delivery resupply, page 46:
Concur. Action has been taken to eliminate the use of the cotton A22
container. Insofar as possible the new nylon type will be used. During
future operations ammunition will be air dropped as prescribed in TM 10-500-53,
which requires that air dropped ammunition have the wooden over pack.

d. Reference item concerning individual equipment, TA 50-901,
page 47: Concur. There is a shortage of replacement TA 50-901 equip-
ment in RVN and CONUS as indicated by slow receipts in RVN. As equip-
ment is received it is issued to fill dues out. Recommend units reiss-
ue as much TA 50-901 equipment as possible to replacements as it is
recovered from departing personnel.

e. Reference item concerning high deadline rate for base power
generators, page 49: Concur. Sixty KW and 100 KW generators are arriving
in RVN in quantity, and will alleviate the need to use tactical generators
for base power.

Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10

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
1st Incl

21 APR 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
30 April 1967 (MCS CSFOR-55) (U)

f. Reference item concerning frequency overcrowding, pages 45 and 46: Concur in this observation. Units have been encouraged to give strong emphasis to operator training, regardless of the rank of the operator, to insure absolute familiarity with the equipment. When to use high and low power is necessarily a matter of operator discretion however, operators regardless of rank, must be fully appraised of the impact the use of high power has on frequency congestion in the theater. Monitoring and critiques of net operation are beneficial in achieving good radio procedure and net discipline.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


E. L. KENNEDY
Cpt. AGC
Asst. Adjutant General

15 Incl
nc

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Declassified after 12 years
DOC DIR 5200.10

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GPOV DT (15 May 67) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
From 1K, II Field Force, Vietnam (RCS CSFOR-65)


1K, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 10 OCT 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. Reference para 2c, 2d Ind and page 49, basic: Generators are
currently being managed under the Closed Loop Program.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

15 Incl
nc

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II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM TROOP LIST

1 Feb 67 - 30 Apr 67

UNITS DEPLOYED

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
196th Inf Bde (Sep)(Lt) (OPCON)	9 Apr 67	III MAF, I CTZ

UNITS ASSIGNED

HHC, II FFORCEV	10 Jan 66	LONG BINH
HHC, II FFORCEV Arty	17 Jan 66	LONG BINH
HHC, 8th TAB, 25th Arty	13 Aug 66	LONG BINH
2d CA Co	7 Dec 66	LONG BINH
9th Trans Co (Car)	23 Aug 66	LONG BINH
44th AFU	1 Oct 66	LONG BINH
552d MP Co	23 Sep 66	LONG BINH

UNITS ATTACHED

2d Bn, 34th Armor	12 Sep 66	LONG BINH
5th Bn, 2d Arty (AW SP) & D Btry, 71st Arty (AW)	27 Nov 66	LONG BINH
53d Sig Bn (Corps) *	4 Jun 66	LONG BINH
16th Sig Det	16 May 66	LONG BINH
7th Mil Hist Det	1 Jun 66	LONG BINH
16th MI Det	4 Jun 66	LONG BINH
29th Chem Det	10 Mar 66	LONG BINH
Det 32, 5th Weather Sqdn	1 Oct 66	LONG BINH

Incl 1

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LI FIELD FORCE VIETNAM TROOP LIST

1 Feb 67 - 30 Apr 67

UNITS ATTACHED

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
219th MI Det	20 May 66	LONG BINH
503d RR Bn	8 Jun 66	LONG BINH
517th Engr Det	4 Jun 66	LONG BINH

* In the previous quarter, the 53d Sig Bn was reported as an OPCON unit. It should have been reported as attached.

OPCON UNITS

1st Inf Div	15 Mar 66	DI AN
9th Inf Div	14 Dec 66	BEAR CAT
25th Inf Div (-)	22 Mar 66	CU CHI
1st ATF	Jun 66	NUI DAT
3d Bde, 4th Inf Div	16 Oct 66	DAU TIENG
173d Abn Bde (Sep)	22 Mar 66	BIEN HOA
199th Inf Bde (Sep) (Lt)	10 Dec 66	LONG BINH
11th ACR	26 Sep 66	XUAN LOC
23d Arty Gp	15 Mar 66	PHU LOI
54th Arty Gp	1 Oct 66	XUAN LOC
12th Avn Gp	15 Mar 66	LONG BINH
246th PSYOP Co	6 Dec 66	BIEN HOA

TENANT UNIT

61st Med Det **	25 Jun 66	LONG BINH
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** Previously the 61st Med Det was reported as attached. It should have been reported as a Tenant Unit.

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LINE	UNIT	PROVINCE	STATION	COORDINATES	COG NO.
1	II FORGEV	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT051111	CONSPIRACY
2	1ST INF DIV	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT910060	II FORGEV
3	1ST BDE, 1ST INF DIV	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT955497	1ST INF DIV
4	1/2D INF BN	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT960490	1ST BDE, 1ST INF DIV
5	1/26TH INF BN	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT974499	1ST BDE, 1ST INF DIV
6	1/28TH INF BN	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT954498	1ST BDE, 1ST INF DIV
7	2D BDE, 1ST INF DIV	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT907073	1ST INF DIV
8	2/16TH INF BN	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT905077	2D BDE, 1ST INF DIV
9	1/18TH INF BN	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT907076	2D BDE, 1ST INF DIV
10	2/18TH INF BN	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT903077	2D BDE, 1ST INF DIV
11	3D BDE, 1ST INF DIV	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT764378	1ST INF DIV
12	2/2D INF BN (MECH)	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT784379	3D BDE, 1ST INF DIV
13	1/16TH INF BN	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT770379	3D BDE, 1ST INF DIV
14	2/28TH INF BN	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT764380	3D BDE, 1ST INF DIV
15	1/4TH CAV SQDN	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT869175	1ST INF DIV
16	1ST INF DIV ARTY	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT867157	1ST INF DIV
17	1/5TH ARTY BN (105T)	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT965490	1ST INF DIV ARTY
18	8/6TH ARTY BN (1585P)	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT867157	1ST INF DIV ARTY
19	1/7TH ARTY BN (105T)	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT909071	1ST INF DIV ARTY
20	2/33D ARTY BN (105T)	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT760375	1ST INF DIV ARTY
21	1ST AVN BN	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT831171	1ST INF DIV
22	1ST ENGR BN	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT901057	1ST INF DIV
23	121ST SIG BN	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT904051	1ST INF DIV
24					
25					
26					
27					
28					
29					
30					
31	9TH INF DIV	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT163002	II FORGEV
32	1ST BDE, 9TH INF DIV	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT169001	9TH INF DIV
33	2/39TH INF BN	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT163018	1ST BDE, 9TH INF DIV
34	4/39TH INF BN	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT163042	1ST BDE, 9TH INF DIV
35	2/47TH INF BN (MECH)	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT171006	1ST BDE, 9TH INF DIV
36	2D BDE, 9TH INF DIV	DINH TUONG	DONG TAM	XS417439	9TH INF DIV
37	3/47TH INF BN	DINH TUONG	DONG TAM	XS417439	2D BDE, 9TH INF DIV
38	4/47TH INF BN	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT173001	2D BDE, 9TH INF DIV
39	3D BDE, 9TH INF DIV	LONG AN	TAN AN	XS456648	9TH INF DIV
40	3/39TH INF BN	LONG AN	RACH KIEH	XS739697	3D BDE, 9TH INF DIV
41	2/60TH INF BN	LONG AN	AP TAN THANH	XS653623	3D BDE, 9TH INF DIV
42	3/60TH INF BN	DINH TUONG	DONG TAM	YS417439	3D BDE, 9TH INF DIV
43	5/60TH INF BN (MECH)	LONG AN	BINH PHUOC	XS609953	3D BDE, 9TH INF DIV
44	3/5TH CAV SQDN	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT167010	9TH INF DIV
45	9TH INF DIV ARTY	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT172004	9TH INF DIV
46	1/11TH ARTY BN (105T)	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT152018	9TH INF DIV ARTY

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LINE	UNIT	PROVINCE	STATION	COORDINATES	COM HQ
47	2/4TH ARTY BN (105T)	LONG AN	TAN AN	XS546648	9TH INF DIV ARTY
48	3/34TH ARTY BN (105T)	BINH TUONG	DONG TAN	YS417439	3D BDE, 9TH INF DIV
49	1/84TH ARTY BN (155T/8"SP)	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YS168997	9TH INF DIV ARTY
50	9TH AVN BN	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT160012	9TH INF DIV
51	15TH ENGR BN	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT168013	9TH INF DIV
52	9TH SIG BN	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YS170998	9TH INF DIV
53	199TH INF BDE	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	9TH INF DIV
54	2/3D INF BN	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199TH BDE
55	3/7TH INF BN	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199TH BDE
56	4/12TH INF BN	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199TH BDE
57	D/17TH CAV TRP	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199TH BDE
58	2/40TH ARTY BN (105T)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199TH BDE
59	87TH ENGR CO	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199TH BDE
60					
61					
62					
63	25TH INF DIV	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT647153	II FFORCEV
64	1ST BDE, 25TH INF DIV	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT654157	25TH INF DIV
65	4/9TH INF BN	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT662155	1ST BDE, 25TH INF DIV
66	2/14TH INF BN	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT657161	1ST BDE, 25TH INF DIV
67	4/23D INF BN (MECH)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT653164	1ST BDE, 25TH INF DIV
68	2D BDE, 25TH INF DIV	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT644157	25TH INF DIV
69	1/5TH INF BN (MECH)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT653163	2D BDE, 25TH INF DIV
70	1/27TH INF BN	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT639151	2D BDE, 25TH INF DIV
71	2/27TH INF BN	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT642157	2D BDE, 25TH INF DIV
72	3/4TH CAV SQDN	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT654145	25TH INF DIV
73	25TH INF DIV ARTY	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT645156	25TH INF DIV
74	1/8TH ARTY BN (105T)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT650156	25TH INF DIV ARTY
75	7/11TH ARTY BN (105T)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT656163	25TH INF DIV ARTY
76	3/13TH ARTY BN (155/8"SP)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT644156	25TH INF DIV ARTY
77	25TH AVN BN	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT647147	25TH INF DIV
78	65TH ENGR BN	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT656153	25TH INF DIV
79	125TH SIG BN	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT643149	25TH INF DIV
80	3D BDE, 4TH INF DIV	BINH DUONG	DAU TIENG	XA493472	25TH INF DIV
81	2/12TH INF BN	BINH DUONG	DAU TIENG	XA492472	3D BDE, 4TH INF DIV
82	2/22D INF BN (MECH)	BINH DUONG	DAU TIENG	XA490480	3D BDE, 4TH INF DIV
83	3/22D INF BN	BINH DUONG	DAU TIENG	XA490470	3D BDE, 4TH INF DIV
84	C/1/10TH CAV TRP	BINH DUONG	DAU TIENG	XA425473	3D BDE, 4TH INF DIV
85	2/77TH ARTY BN (105T)	BINH DUONG	DAU TIENG	XA495475	3D BDE, 4TH INF DIV
86					
87					
88					
89					
90					
91					
92					
93					
94					
95					
96					
97	173D ABN INF BDE	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	YFO09149	II FFORCEV
98	1/503D ABN INF BN	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	XT998147	173D BDE

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<u>LINE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>CON HQ</u>
99	2/503D ABN INF BN	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	YT025153	173D BDE
100	4/503D ABN INF BN	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	YT022152	173D BDE
101	D/16TH ARMOR	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	YT021141	173D BDE
102	S/17TH CAV TRP	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	YT007156	173D BDE
103	3/319TH ARTY BN (105T)	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	YT013148	173D BDE
104	173D ENGR CO	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	YT006148	173D BDE
105					
106					
107					
108					
109					
110	HQ 1ST ATF	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS435667	II FFORCEV
111	6TH BAR	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS441684	HQ 1ST ATF
112	7TH BAR	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS442765	HQ 1ST ATF
113	3D SAS SQDN	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS435664	HQ 1ST ATF
114	A SQDN/3D CAV REGT	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS431667	HQ 1ST ATF
15	1ST FD REGT (105 PACK)	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS431663	HQ 1ST ATF
16	1ST FD SQDN BAE	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS437665	HQ 1ST ATF
117	103D SIG SQDN	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS432666	HQ 1ST ATF
118					
119					
120	11TH ACR	LONG KHANH	LONG GIAO	YS438968	II FFORCEV
121	1/11TH AC SQDN	LONG KHANH	LONG GIAO	YS440970	11TH ACR
122					
123	3/11TH AC SQDN	LONG KHANH	LONG GIAO	YS433963	11TH ACR
124	919TH ENGR CO	LONG KHANH	LONG GIAO	YS440976	11TH ACR
125					
126					
127					
128					
129					
130	2/34TH AR BN	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT129113	II FFORCEV
131					
132					
133					
134	HQ II FFORCEV ARTY	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT051112	II FFORCEV
135	5/2D ARTY BN (40mm AWSF)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT110120	II FFORCEV ARTY
136	8/25TH ARTY BN (TAB), HBB	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT052112	II FFORCEV ARTY
137	HQ 23D ARTY GP	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT845152	II FFORCEV ARTY
138	1/27TH ARTY BN (155SP)	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT845153	23D ARTY GP
139	2/13TH ARTY BN (105T)	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT847152	23D ARTY GP
140	6/27TH ARTY BN (8"/175SP)	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT757498	23D ARTY GP
141	2/32D ARTY BN (8"/175SP)	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT163522	23D ARTY GP
142	HQ 54TH ARTY GP	LONG KHANH	XUAN LOC	YT467087	II FFORCEV ARTY
143	7/9TH ARTY BN (105T)	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT169005	54TH ARTY GP
144	2/35TH ARTY BN (155 SP)	LONG KHANH	XUAN LOC	YT470097	54TH ARTY GP
145	1/83D ARTY BN (8"/175SP)	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS426657	54TH ARTY GP
146					
147					
148					
149					
150	12TH AVIATION GP	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT058170	II FFORCEV

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
67

<u>LINE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>CON HQ</u>
151	112TH AVN BN	BTNH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT858161	12TH AVN GP
152	145TH AVN BN	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	XT988129	12TH AVN GP
153	222D AVN BN	PHUOC TUY	VUNG TAU	YS296472	12TH AVN GP
154	269TH AVN BN	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT656157	12TH AVN GP
155	214TH AVN BN*	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT167003	12TH AVN GP
156					
157					
158					
159					
160	53D SIG BN	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT050110	II FFORCEV

* The 214th Avn Bn was previously named "Buffalo Avn Bn".

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
B) : 51 TH ENGR DET (TER)

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


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
VC PROVINCIAL AND REGIONAL BOUNDARIES IN THE III CTZ

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1 5

VC ORDER OF BATTLE
IN THE III CTZ




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PRINCIPAL UNITS IN IV GTZ

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



SHADED AREA - 9TH US DIV OPERATIONAL AREA
- PROVINCE BOUNDARIES

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY
TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT
1 February - 30 April 1967

	SUB <u>TOTAL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1. Total air sorties during period: USAF	10,949	
VNAF	4,654	
		<u>15,603</u>
2. Number sorties flown by US aircraft in support of ARVN:	2,305	
3. Number sorties flown by VNAF in support of ARVN:	2,369	
4. Total number sorties flown in support of ARVN:		<u>4,674</u>
5. Number sorties flown by US aircraft in support of US Forces:	10,909	
6. Number sorties flown by VNAF aircraft in support of US Forces:	5	
7. Total number sorties flown in support of US Forces:		<u>10,914</u>
8. Number COMBAT SKY SPOT missions flown in support of ARVN:		<u>141</u>
9. Number COMBAT SKY SPOT missions flown in support of US:		
1st Inf Div	201	
9th Inf Div	54	
25th Inf Div	182	
173d Abn Bde	13	
1st ATF	83	
11th ACR	12	
Other	5	
10. Results of Air Strikes:		<u>550</u>
KBA (BC)	<u>345</u>	
KBA (EST)	<u>1,501</u>	
Structures destroyed	<u>2,842</u>	
Structures damaged	<u>1,196</u>	
Secondary explosions	<u>310</u>	
11. Ordnance expended:		
Bombs		<u>33,821</u>
Rockets		<u>37,146</u>
CBU		<u>427,084</u>
NAPALM		<u>18,136</u>
20mm		<u>2,630,500</u>

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Inlosures 10, 12, 13, 14 , pages 70-93
Withdrawn at Hqs DA.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE, VII CTZ
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96366

11 June 1967

AVFBG-DOF

11
SUBJECT: Operations in Inundated Areas Seminar (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Attached for your information are summaries of presentations made at the Operations in Inundated Areas Seminar held at II FORCIV conference room on 13 March 1967.

2. Presentations were:

- a. Operations in the RUNG SAT - 1st Inf Div. (Incl 1)
- b. Use of H&G Boats on CEDAR FALLS - 25th Inf Div. (Incl 2)
- c. Operation FAIRFAX - 199th Inf Bde. (Incl 3)
- d. Special Forces Delta Operations - 5th SFG. (Incl 4)
- e. Training, Plans, and Organization for operations in inundated areas - 9th Inf Div. (Incl 5)
- f. Use of Mechanized/Armor Forces in the Delta - IV CTZ SA. (Incl 6)
- g. Naval support for Army operations - COMNAVFORV. (Incl 7)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

7 Incl
as

Eugene M. McGrath
EUGENE M. McGRATH
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

DISTRIBUTION: D
Plus
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2-SA, IV CTZ
2-5th SFG

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OPERATIONS IN THE RUNG SAT

1ST INF DIVISION

1. The first presentation was given by the 1st Inf Div on operations in the RUNG SAT. During 1966 the 1st Inf Div conducted Operations LEXINGTON, BATON ROUGE and CHARLESTON in the southern portion of the RUNG SAT. The mission of the division was to conduct extensive patrolling, ambushes, and search and destroy operations. The concept of the operation was to establish a forward command post and fire support base in the RUNG SAT and a logistics base nearby which was also used as a drying out area for the companies. In general, the companies conducted independent operations for 24-48 hours and were then transported to the drying out area for 48-72 hours. A combination of helicopters and ARVN river assault group boats were utilized to insert and extract units into the various AOs.

2. The discussion of operations LEXINGTON III, BATON ROUGE and CHARLESTON highlighted practical experiences and the following lessons learned:

a. A low level aerial recon can show the unit commander locations where unmapped streams and high grounds might afford the VC a base camp site. Since the VC do not set up base camps in the lowlands or the mangrove swamps, an aerial recon can save valuable time by allowing the company commanders to pinpoint the most likely areas of VC activity.

b. Stream crossing techniques must be learned and practiced prior to operating in the RSSZ. Safety measures must be strictly adhered to in a river crossing.

c. The most effective method to search an area is to allow the platoons to search independently, thereby obtaining a thorough search and full coverage of the entire area.

d. Radios that are not protected from water become inoperable. Radios can be waterproofed by placing them in plastic bags and sealing them with tape.

e. Stream crossings are best made at high tide when men can float across and tow the heavy equipment on air mattresses. When tide is low the exposed mud banks are very steep and double the length of time needed to cross a given stream.

f. There are very few LZs in the RSSZ. Bomb craters serve adequately as one ship LZs. LZ construction air strikes may be requested to make crater LZs.

g. F P S4 radar set was employed constantly at the bn fwd CP. This allowed a minimum amount of men as a security force and permitted the maximum amount of personnel to engage in search and destroy operations.

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h. Hammocks are indispensable in the RSSZ because of the wet ground. The Army issue hammock is unsatisfactory because of the difficulty of getting out of it quickly and quietly. Recommend that the hammock be altered or replaced with a light weight hammock for operations in the RSSZ.

i. Small boat operations (RAG, LCM, others) are largely dependent upon tide variations. Reliable estimates of the time enroute must be obtained.

j. Ample time must be allowed the ambush patrol to prepare the site, eat, maintain weapons, set up hammocks and obtain adequate rest. This takes more time in swamps than on dry ground.

k. Ambushes conducted along main rivers and at stream junctions throughout the RSSZ produced the best results. The Viet Cong appear to utilize the rivers freely at night. The danger of not knowing the number of sampans moving into an ambush site can be alleviated by use of claymore mines. Placing them on the flanks of the ambush site and firing them to seal off the killing zone reduces the threat of additional sampans firing into the ambush site.

l. To maintain the health of the command, each company was limited to 48 hours for operation in the RSSZ. Upon completion of the operation and immediately after extraction from the swamps, the battalion surgeon conducted a medical examination of the entire company to check the condition of feet

m. Once a VC base camp was located in the RSSZ the destruction of the installation was a difficult task, since the necessary demolitions cannot be carried through the RSSZ terrain. A supply of cratering charges, demolitions, blasting devices held at the battalion supply point ready for delivery by helicopters proved to be of great value in the destruction of these installations.

n. A method of locating command detonated mines was to locate VC markers, such as sticks in the water that do not move with the current. These markers were used as reference points by the VC so that they could detonate the mines under boats.

o. Extreme caution must be exercised in selecting landing sites during small boat operations. Tidal changes and inconsistency of the soil composition in the RSSZ can hamper operations. Tide data obtained from S-2 is a valuable factor in selecting time and place. Detailed reconnaissance insures the best possible landing sites.

p. River crossing equipment for each platoon should include a 100-150 ft rope. Each soldier should carry an air mattress if boats are not available. The salt water in the RUMG SAF will ruin air mattresses eventually, so extra stocks should be requested in advance.

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q. The pace count changes considerably in the mangrove swamps. Each unit should check its pace for 100 meters. Approximately 280 steps were used to measure 100 meter.

r. Individual morale and alertness decreased after 48 hours in the swamp. Rotating troops approx every 48 hours and giving them a 2-4 day break solves this problem.

s. The VC in the RSSZ did not appear to be well trained or aggressive.

t. The COMNAVFORVINO located in the bn TOC proved valuable in coordinating requirements with the VNN and US Navy. Daily liaison is necessary.

3. The 1st Inf Div concluded that there is no question of it's ability to operate in the RUNG SAT. There may be a question concerning the length of time a unit can effectively operate in this type environment because of medical problems.

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USE OF RAG BOATS ON CEDAR FALLS

25th Infantry Division

1. The 25th Inf Div presentation covered the use of ARVN River Assault Groups (RAG) during and after Operation CEDAR FALLS.
2. Using RAG boats from the ARVN Navy, plus local PF and CIDG groups, the 25th Inf Div conducted four separate operations.
3. In the first operation, RAG boats were used in a search and destroy operation. The RAGs were used for transportation on the many streams in the area and to search the stream banks. Because of the heavy vegetation it was not practical to search from the shore side. The number of VC found hiding along the banks clearly indicated this technique was valuable. The added mobility and ability to position troops in previously inaccessible areas was particularly noteworthy.
4. In the second operation, the 25th Inf Div used RAG boats to position forces along the streams in the objective area. In addition, a reaction force was assembled aboard engineer assault boats. Again, the boats provided much-needed mobility. After the maneuver elements were landed, the boats remained in the area to be used for fire support missions and to cover water escape routes.
5. On the 3d operation, RAG boats were used to position an enveloping force. Surprise was the dominant factor. The noise of the boats was accepted as normal river traffic noise by the VC. The enveloping force was able to achieve tactical surprise and attack the rear of the VC positions.
6. The 4th operation was somewhat different in that the RAG boats were used to block an avenue of escape. Maneuver elements on the ground pushed the VC forces toward the river area which was covered by the RAG boats.
7. The lessons learned by the 25th Inf Div were:
 - a. Boats provided mobility in an area not suitable for helicopter or foot operations.
 - b. Boats permitted searching stream banks and placing blocking forces along water escape routes.
 - c. Command boats are a must. When advisors or liaison personnel are available they should be a part of the command group.
 - d. A fast, small engineer assault boat was used for point and rear security.
 - e. Avoid putting too many people in one boat.
 - f. Use stream bank vegetation to cover moves.

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- g. On searches, move back and forth across the river to prevent the VC from guessing where operations will be conducted next.
- h. Use engineer assault boats for smaller streams and to carry reaction forces.
- i. Landing craft and the monitor (fire support boat) can be used to establish a fire support base.
- j. Use patrol boats and helicopter gunships to secure the movement of the main assault groups.
- k. Fire missions from aerial observers and forward observers must be coordinated to provide accurate, safe, responsive fires.
- l. Smoke and marking panels should be used to help identify friendly elements.
- m. Liaison and joint planning become important at the operational level.
- n. Advance planning takes from 36-48 hours. Planning should be detailed enough to provide information on signal nets, supply, and methods of operation. Differences in Army and Navy supply items must be considered.
- o. Rehearsals and familiarization rides are recommended. Communications and control measures should be exercised.
- p. Possibility of attack by friendly air must be offset by signals, coordination and contact.
- q. Control critical points along the bank. Long stretches of streams that end in a bend are particularly critical.
- r. Fire control lines must be carefully selected. Use of stream banks is unsatisfactory, because control of the banks is necessary.
- s. Boat maintenance is a problem. Prior planning and coordination with repair agencies must be made.
- t. Careful reconnaissance and detailed terrain studies are needed. Navigation in a maze of streams is difficult.
- u. A lightweight life preserver is needed.

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OPERATION FAIRFAX

199th Inf Bde

1. Operation FAIRFAX conducted by the 199th Inf Bde, typifies operations which are neither completely riverine nor completely land based. This operation was conducted in the areas south, southeast, and northwest of Saigon. The mission was to destroy VC guerrillas and infrastructure and to promote Revolutionary Development. The terrain in this area is mostly rice paddy with a network of steep banked canals, streams, and ditches. There are a number of fresh and salt water marshes in the area. Tidal fluctuations were important because they determine what is and what is not inundated.

2. Originating from company bases dispersed throughout the area, most of the daylight operations were search and destroy and cordon and search missions. Both helicopter and small boat operations were conducted. The ability to move by land, sea, or air is a must for operations in inundated areas.

3. Night operations consisted mostly of ambushes set up along streams, canals, and rivers. Ambushes consisting of a rifle squad and a machine gun section were typical of infantry units, while platoon size ambushes were typical of cavalry ambushes. Use of starlight scopes proved to be extremely valuable. Tracer fire marked the limits of the kill zone, into which all fire was directed. The patrol leader using the starlight scope would then adjust fire as necessary. It was surprising to note that the same ambush would have repeated contact in the same place in a two or three hour period. Ambushing 2 or 3 sampans in a 5 or 10 minute period indicated the VC have a problem communicating while afloat. The most productive ambush period was between 2000 and 2300 hours.

4. Lessons learned were:

- a. To be effective personnel often have to stay in waist deep water; a drying out period after operations is a must.
- b. A small out is very likely to become infected.
- c. The use of silicone grease on the feet is effective, but it is hard on socks.
- d. Sand bags are necessary to build stable machine gun platforms.
- e. Fire discipline is important for two reasons; not springing the ambush too early and conserving ammunition. Resupply is very difficult in this type operation unless helicopters are available.
- f. Operations in marshy areas are particularly hard on weapons. They must be cleaned at least twice a day.
- g. Practice and rehearse methods for crossing streams. Particularly important are hasty or expedient stream crossings, which should be included in replacement training programs.

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h. Water survival is important. Place good swimmers in each element to help others.

i. Starlight scopes must be kept dry.

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SPECIAL FORCES DELTA OPERATIONS

5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP

1. The presentation by the 5th Special Forces Group concentrated on operations in the Mekong Delta during the 1966 floods. Detailed description of terrain, problems, and solutions to these problems were especially informative.

2. The low ground and depth of water turn a large portion of the Delta into a lake during the wet season (May to Sep). Because the CIDG and USSF not only operate in but live in these areas, they have a great deal of experience with operations in inundated areas.

3. Experiences and lessons learned:

a. Mines and booby traps become less of a problem when area is flooded.

b. VC do not have base areas but they do maintain way stations. Way stations are usually caches of supplies and weapons along the banks of canals or at the base of hummocks in the flooded areas. Thus the VC can continue to use this area for infiltration routes during the wet season.

c. VC were affected by flooding, the same as our forces. VC were forced to move to sampans, treetops, and hummocks of land. His reduced mobility and support capability effected his morale as well as his operations.

d. Destruction of bridges increased during the rainy season. The VC used sampans to transport munitions to the bridge sites.

e. Major VC elements moved into Cambodia during the rainy season. Guerrilla forces were left behind to protect caches and dependents left behind.

f. VC imbedded sticks in the bottom to mark kill zones in flooded areas.

g. CIDG camps are easily flooded. Camps must be built so that they are higher than the surrounding ground. Fill for walls must be dug from outside the walls, not inside.

h. Defensive claymores were put on floats. They tended to turn and face friendly forces. Painting the backs white helped determine the direction of fire.

i. Submerged mines hamper boat operations.

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j. Indirect fire support becomes a problem. Camps are not mutually supporting and location of indirect fire weapons becomes critical. 4.2 inch and 81mm mortar firing positions become unusable. Main fire support comes from aircraft and gunships.

k. Because of the flooded conditions many airfields were not usable. Parachute drops into the water were used to resupply the camp. Supplies were recovered by boats.

l. Use tops of well-built bunkers as helipads and mortar firing positions.

m. Use oil drums to build floating platforms as helipads and firing positions.

n. Use of sampans becomes a must. Troops must be trained to use sampans without over-turning them.

o. Problems in command and control are exaggerated. Use of L-19s and UH-1Ds as control ships is ideal.

p. Operational mobility and, therefore, range increased with use of boats. Logistical, support, and control problems at long ranges from bases had to be planned for in advance.

q. Sampans are sunk when not in use. Sunken sampans can be raised, hauled out, and used. If they are not used, destroy them.

r. M-79s become ideal indirect fire weapons. They are easy to fire from boats.

s. Use ground formation small unit tactics for boat operations.

t. Use company sized operations when flooded. Use platoon operations when water level starts to go down.

u. The enemy is often engaged at long ranges over the water. Submachine guns are not effective. Rifles, K79s and machine guns are better because range of engagement is longer.

v. Radar was not effective because of distortion and clutter when used over water.

w. Starlight scopes can be used, but operators must be trained in use of them over water.

x. Use of airboats permits a combination of naval, air and cavalry tactics. Flanking sweeps, strafing runs, and frontal charges become feasible.

y. Bring plastic repair kits along when operating with plastic boats.

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z. Repair parts for boat motors are critical. Every effort to anticipate needs must be made. Parts and spare motors should be carried on operations.

aa. Filter fuel at base camp when you put it into plastic cans. Trying to filter it afloat can be disastrous.

ab. Prestock supplies during the dry season for the rainy season. Type of supplies that should be stockpiled are: sandbags, cement, wire, stakes, nails, roofing materiel, 55 gal drums, boat and motor repair parts.

ac. Put a rock or wood core in the center of earthen berms to keep them from washing away.

ad. Pumps are required to keep camps pumped out.

ae. Plan for MEDEVAC. Use of helicopters is not always feasible because of the lack of landing areas. High speed boats which can evacuate wounded to helicopter landing areas become a must.

af. Personnel air cushion vehicles (PACV) proved to be very valuable. The speed and armament of these vehicles further increased their effectiveness. They were used in the Plain of Reeds, and traveled over water, mud, hummocks, clumps of small trees, and tall reeds.

ag. Training for small boat operations must start early. Familiarization with boats, loading, formations, and control signals are important for all troops. Boat operators and both boat and motor repairman must be trained well in advance of operations. They must be ready in time to conduct the general troop training mentioned earlier.

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TRAINING, PLANS, AND ORGANIZATION FOR OPERATIONS

IN INUNDATED AREAS

9TH INFANTRY DIVISION

1. General: Topics discussed were:
 - a. Concept of operations.
 - b. Plans and operations.
2. Concept of operations: The riverine campaign will be essentially a land campaign which uses the waterways as avenues of approach, rather than as barriers. Riverine operations will strengthen government control of the waterways, which are essential to the commerce of the area, and thus strengthen government control of the population.
3. Plans and Operations:
 - a. Missions for riverine operations are assigned by the combined campaign plan. Operational planning will be backward planning, as in amphibious and airmobile planning. Starting with the ground tactical plan to accomplish the mission, operations will be planned backwards through assault, movement, and loading phases. Naval forces will be integrated into all phases, not just the movement and assault.
 - b. Operations will be primarily search and destroy. Naval forces will provide fire support, logistics, command facilities, and mobility for reaction forces. Control of flat trajectory weapons fire will be one coordination problem between forces.
 - c. An intelligence data base for the general area of operations is being collected. Operational plans based on this intelligence, will be made as much as a month in advance. Riverine forces have the capability to rapidly regroup and redeploy to react to new intelligence, even though fully committed.

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USE OF MECHANIZED FORCES IN THE DELTA

IV CTZ SENIOR ADVISOR

1. The IV Corps TZ is bounded by the III Corps on the northeast, by Cambodia on the north, and the Gulf of Thailand on the west and the South China Sea on the south and east. The Corps Zone is a flat, poorly drained Delta region, criss-crossed with a dense network of rivers, streams and canals. Exceptions to this normal type terrain are significant in that they provide base areas for the Viet Cong forces. Exceptional areas are:

a. The seven mountains area which is in CHAU DOC Province adjacent to the Cambodian Border. The highest elevation exceeds 700 meters and represents the highest elevation in the Delta. These mountains, while small, are heavily forested and rugged. They are honeycombed with caves and tunnels. They are well fortified and provide excellent defensive positions for the VC. Special Forces conduct extensive search and destroy operations in this complex.

b. The U MINH Forest area on the southwest coast is considered by the VC to be a liberated area. It is recognized by friendly forces to be a major VC base area within the IV CTZ.

c. The coastal mangrove swamps and marshes exist in the CA MAU Peninsula in southern AN XUYEN Province and extend along the coastal area of the South China Sea to the III Corps boundary. A small, somewhat less dense mangrove swamp, exists in the northern portion of KIEN GIANG Province adjacent to the Cambodian Border. These swampy areas provide excellent concealment areas for the infiltration of weapons and materiel. They are also utilized for training areas regrouping, and supply areas.

d. The Plain of Reeds encompasses virtually all of KIEN TUONG Province, a portion of KIEN PHONG Province and extends into the III CTZ. During the dry season, this area is practically a sun baked dry lake, but during the wet season it is completely flooded. Reeds grow up to 6 feet above water level. For the most part, the area is uninhabited. It is used by the VC as a base area.

2. In the IV Corps area there are approximately 700 km of roads. The primary road is National Route 4 from SAIGON through MY THO, CAN THO, SOC TRANG, BAC LIEU and CA MAU. Secondary roads connect districts with Province capitals. A portion of these roads became impassible to wheel vehicles in the rainy season. They do not create any special problems for M113 traffic. Bridges in the area are numerous, narrow, and barely support M113 traffic. These bridges slow down M113 units as the individual M113 has to be ground guided across the bridge in order to prevent damage or destruction. If armor units are to be deployed in the Delta, a major engineering effort will be required to reinforce and widen numerous bridges throughout the area. Ton capacity varies from 3.5 to 6 tons on secondary roads and up to 20 tons on National Route 4. Average width of bridges on secondary roads is 112".

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3. Waterways: Primary transportation routes in the CTZ are the waterways. There are approximately 1,400 km of major water routes, and 2,000 km of canals with a depth of 2 or more meters. This increases to over 3,000 km in the wet season. Major waterways are the BASSAC and MEKONG Rivers, both navigable to ocean going vessels. Crossing these waterways is time consuming. There are only 5 ferry sites in the Corps area. Time for one M113 troop to cross at these sites varies from 1 hour at CAN THO to 6 hours at CAO LAMH. Recently, a 2/2 Cav troop swam the complete troop across in 32 minutes, covering a distance of 1200 to 1400 meters. All waterways are important to the VC in that they are heavily traveled by the population during the day, which affords the VC the opportunity to mingle with the civilians without being detected. The VC no longer have unrestricted use of major waterways as US PBR and RAG units now patrol them. During the wet season there are numerous canals that permit travel by sampan which is not possible in the dry season. As a matter of fact, in the wet season sampan traffic is not limited to canals but is possible on open rice paddies. River craft in the area are capable of carrying large pay loads rapidly throughout the area.

4. Weather: The weather breaks down into two distinct seasons: wet and dry. The wet season prevails from May through December. The wet season restricts the movement of friendly foot troops. Viet Cong forces gain a limited advantage during the wet season. Rainfall provides potable water to the VC in base areas. During the dry season this water must often be transported in from outside areas. Potable water in the dry season also effects friendly forces as it must be carried into operational areas. In the dry season the VC forces are more restricted to major canal and wood lines.

5. Trafficability: a. The MACOV study team has stated that 87% of the IV CTZ is suitable for armor operations.

b. When entering areas where M113 units have never previously operated, a map and air reconnaissance of the area is essential. This reconnaissance should be performed by the commander. During the operational phase, utilization of armor air observers who are familiar with the characteristics of the terrain and tides, will greatly enhance the mobility and the maneuverability of the ground forces. As a general rule M113s have been able to travel without difficulty through rice paddies. In uncultivated areas, movement of large numbers of water buffalo indicates the terrain can be negotiated by M113 units.

c. There are many important factors to mobility of M113 units in the Delta. First and foremost is leadership. Next is the mental attitude or "mental mobility" of the commander. Knowledge of the terrain and how to use it, past experience with field expedients to overcome obstacles, knowledge of capabilities and characteristics of the vehicles and organization, unit training, individual driving proficiency, knowledge of the use of the "daisy chain", multiple canal crossing, selection of best canal crossing sites along route of march, use of the capstan kit and commercial marine anchors are all necessary items of proficiency.

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d. Best time for M113s to maneuver in the Delta is during periods of high tides. We habitually use tide tables in planning operations that involve M113 units. M113s can cross canals at high tide with little effort. Crossing becomes very difficult at low tides and requires up to five or six times as long to cross as it would at high tides. This is because of extremely high banks which increase entrance and exit difficulties. To create entrances and exits the use of demolitions and pick and shovel is required. Rapid current associated with rising and falling tides also make canal crossing very difficult. The absence of water means the vehicle must negotiate two to four feet of mud. Speed is lower in the wet season but the crossing of numerous small canals is easier. In the dry season speed is higher, but the paddy dikes which are as hard as concrete slow the vehicle down and tear up track suspension systems. Aircraft are used to help locate by-passes and to mark canal crossing, suspected VC locations, objectives and check-points.

6. Organization: a. At present, there are three ARVN infantry divisions in the IV Corps area. They are the 7th, 9th and 21st. Each ARVN division has one cavalry regt attached to it. This tank regiment should be equated to a US squadron, or mech bn.

b. Tank units were deleted from Delta deployment because they were too heavy and had limited cross country mobility. Roads and bridges would not support their movements. The M114 was also deleted from Delta deployment because it did not have the cross country mobility required to negotiate the terrain in the Delta.

7. Employment: There are many controversies concerning the employment of armor personnel carriers. One school of thought is that the vehicle should be employed to carry the riflemen to the enemy so that he is fresh to fight. Another is that the vehicle is a combat assault vehicle and should be used as a tank. In the Delta we find a combination of both schools of thought. The vehicle is used primarily as a tank but it is also used as a transporter of infantry. All operations in the Delta employing M113s have as a minimum one M113 troop with one infantry, reconnaissance, or RF/PF company attached. The M113s are disposed as follows: 2 in the troop HQ, 3 in each of 3 line platoons, and 4 in the support platoon, for a total of 15. All M113s have a combination of three or four machine guns per vehicle; the support platoon also has two 57mm recoilless rifles and three 81mm mortars. All of these weapons have been mounted in or on the carriers and are capable of being fired instantly. Considering all individual, automatic, and crew served weapons of the troop and of the attached company, this is the most heavily armed unit within the ARVN Infantry Division capable of placing all of its organic fire power and personnel on a given objective. Total personnel in such a combined arms team normally averages 225 to 250 men.

8. Results: a. During the year of 1966 armor elements in the OTZ killed 1,004 VC, captured 638 VC or VC suspects. These units also captured 315 individual and crew served weapons along with great quantities of ammunition, mines, grenades, clothing, medical supplies, documents and other miscellaneous war materiel. These figures are impressive as they represent only VC killed or captured by the armor units. Estimated killed, wounded and carried off the battle field are not included, although we know our friendly casualties have been approximately 4 WIA per/KIA.

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b. During the same period of time armor elements had 73 killed and 272 wounded. This represents a very favorable ratio for the ARVN armor units. The majority of the casualties were caused by M13s being damaged or destroyed by mines and antitank fire. Personnel inside M13s have normally been killed. Those on top have been blown off the track and represent the majority of the wounded. Therefore, it is normal to see armor infantry personnel in the Delta ride on top of the vehicle.

9. Requirements: Present corps requirements have placed a variety of missions on the armored cavalry squadrons in the IV CTZ, ranging from their primary mission of conducting offensive operations to routine missions of road security. These missions have taxed the capabilities of the units to the fullest. There is a definite requirement to introduce additional armor forces into the Delta to accomplish assigned missions. With additional cavalry squadrons, more ARVN battalions could be released to support Revolutionary Development. These armor units would be employed to conduct sweeps, raids, reconnaissance and reaction missions.

10. Conclusion: Terrain dictates where armor may or may not be employed. 87% of the IV Corps area is suitable for the employment of armor/mech and units in M13s.

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NAVAL SUPPORT FOR ARMY OPERATIONS

COMNAVFORV

MOBILE RIVERINE FORCE OPERATIONS

1. Introduction: The mobile riverine force was originally conceived as an afloat force capable of housing and supporting a reinforced infantry brigade with associated supporting elements. The navy contribution to such a force would include five APBs (BARRACKS SHIPS) and two river assault squadrons. SECDEF has approved two APBs, one configured as a brigade command ship, and two river assault squadrons.

2. Lift Capability: a. Total troop capacity of the two APBs is 1430. Lift capability of one river assault squadron is 1040 if all 26 armored troop carriers (ATC) are operational and used exclusively for troop lift. In addition, to the ATC, each river assault squadron has assigned 5 monitors (gunships), 16 ASPB (assault support patrol boats), 2 CCBs (command communications boats) and 1 refueler. (Army MOGAS)

b. If two river assault squadrons were assigned to the mobile riverine force, there would be an excess lift capability. In addition, there would be a 360 man reduction in troop berthing capacity resulting from the additional embarked Navy personnel.

c. Thus, it has evolved that the mobile riverine force will be supported by one river assault squadron, the second squadron will support the land base at DONG TAM. As tempo of operations fluctuate between the mobile riverine base and DONG TAM, assault craft can be temporarily reassigned between the two bases. The two bases will be capable of conducting combined, mutually supporting or independent operations.

d. Presently under consideration is a proposal to add an APL (a non self-propelled barracks barge) to the mobile riverine force. This would provide an increased troop berthing capability of 570. There are obvious disadvantages to the APL because of its lack of mobility.

3. Command relationships: a. The conduct of riverine operations by Army and Navy forces is a new concept which will require the utmost coordination and cooperation by all concerned. The command relationships for riverine operations set forth by MACV planning Directive 12-66 of 10 December 1966 have been kept flexible purposely to provide commanders with maximum leeway in reaching effective and workable arrangements.

b. US Army Forces conducting riverine operations in III and IV JFS will be under the operational control of CG II FFORCEV, who may exercise this operational control through designated subordinate US Army Headquarters.

c. US Navy riverine forces will be under the operational control of COMNAVFORV who will exercise this control through commander riverine assault force OFF 117 (COMRIVFLOTONE).

d. During operational planning phases Army-Navy relationship will be one of coordination.

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e. Command relations between CG, II FFORCEV, COMNAVFORV, and SA, IV Corps will be one of coordination.

f. Command relations between the mobile riverine force and the senior advisor IV Corps will be one of coordination and/or mutual support.

g. Command relations between the mobile riverine forces and other US/FVNAF forces will be one of mutual support. Relations with RVNAF forces will be carried out through advisory channels.

h. During riverine operations the Navy provides close support to the Army. Each service retains command of its forces during these operations.

i. The base commander for all joint Army and Navy bases, whether on land or afloat will be the senior Army commander assigned. Relations between Army and Navy units assigned to a joint base will be one of coordination and mutual support. The Army base commander is responsible for defense of the base.

4. Fire Power and Armor: a. The riverine assault craft, with the exception of the ASPB, are all conversions of the LCM-6. The conversion design is completely new. Safety of embarked personnel has been emphasized through the use of XAR-30-type high hardness steel and bar armor heat round trigger shields. In addition below waterline hull blisters provide hull protection, minimum draft, and increased stability. Each craft provides ballistic protection against .50 cal and 57mm heat round attacks.

b. Probably the greatest threat to the riverine assault force will come from command detonated mines. The ASPB will be the principal mine countermeasures craft of the force. This is a completely new craft designed for riverine assault operations. Each ASPB will be capable of towing mine sweeping gear designed to defeat command detonated water mines by severing electrical cables between the mine and detonator. The ASPB will be capable of towing the sweep gear at speeds in excess of the maximum speed of all other riverine assault craft. Hull construction of the ASPB is of 7/32" steel with operator positions, engines and magazines protected by dual hardness armor capable of defeating .50 cal AP and 57mm recoilless rifle rounds.

c. Each ATC and refueler will be equipped with one 20mm cannon and two .50 cal machine guns each with associated mk 18 40mm grenade.

d. The ASPB will have one 81mm mortar, one single 20mm cannon, a twin .30 cal MG converted to 7.62mm and 2 mk 18 grenade launchers located in the vicinity of coxswain station. The .30 cal MG will be backfitted to a twin .50 cal MG later in the year.

e. Monitors will be armed with one 40mm cannon and associated .50 cal MG, an 81mm mortar, a 20mm cannon and two .50 cal MG with associated mk 18 grenade launchers. The COB (command communications boat) has the same armament as the monitor with the exception of an 81mm mortar.

f. The ASPBs are the principal minesweepers of the riverine assault force although all ATCs will also have a minesweeping capability.

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g. ASPBs, monitors and CCBs will be equipped with Raytheon path-finder 1900 radars. In addition, CCBs will have a Decca navigator system installed.

h. All craft with exception of the CCBs, will be equipped with 2 VRC-46 and 1 FRC-25. The CCB in its capacity as an afloat command post will be provided with 5 VRC-46, 3 GRC-106, 1 FRC-25 and 1 ARC-27.

5. Concept of Future Operations: a. River assault squadron nine commenced basic riverine training with the 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div on 16 Jan 67 in the RUNG SAT special zone. With the exception of one company, all personnel of the 2d Battalion/60th Inf received four days' basic riverine indoctrination. This was accomplished by use of borrowed VNN RAG boats consisting of 7 LCM troop carriers and 1 CCB. 3d Bde training completed on 7 Feb 67.

b. On 12 Feb similar training commenced with the 2d Bde, 9th Inf Div; however, as a result of numerous attacks on minesweepers on the LONG TAU River, the principal shipping channel from the South China Sea to SAIGON, training was suspended indefinitely in favor of a battalion size operation in the RUNG SAT Special Zone. Since 16 Feb, the 3d Bn/47th Inf and River Assault Squadron Nine have been working as a closely coordinated team in the conduct of search and destroy operations in the RUNG SAT Special Zone.

c. Perhaps the most significant results of this operation, nicknamed "River Raider I", has been the almost total suppression of attacks on minesweepers or other shipping on the LONG TAU River for the past month. During this period there have been no casualties, personnel or material, to Navy patrol forces, minesweepers, or merchant shipping resulting from enemy action.

d. On 8 March, River Assault Flotilla One received its first thirteen ATCs. April should see a steady flow of additional craft arrivals. ASPBs, which are now construction, are not expected in-country prior to July of this year.

e. For the immediate future, joint operations in the RUNG SAT Special Zone are expected to continue with the second brigade. The RUNG SAT is not a glamorous location from the standpoint of large scale action, but it is an excellent training ground for riverine warfare because of its myriad waterways and thick mangrove swamps. These provide a challenging environment for search and destroy operations.

f. Upon arrival in-country of sufficient number of craft and the necessary number of Navy support assets, it is planned to locate a river assault squadron at DONG TAM to support operations staged from that base.

g. Currently, members of the Second Brigade and River Assault Flotilla One staff are engaged in preparing detailed operating procedures and relationships, organizational instructions, and planning documents. There are many problems to be solved and details to be worked out, but from the highly successful results of our joint operations to date, we are confident the mobile riverine force will make its impact felt in the Delta.

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